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“Pluralism has led us to the civil war” (Rahmon, 1992)1									
																																																																						
1 In (Gaume, 1995). 
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“Rahmonov is a dictator, and one of the perks of the job is that you can redefine the 
past as you please and few will dare to disagree with you.” (Kalder, 2009).   	
	
	
“To what extent have all these nationalizing efforts by political elites over the last 25 
years succeeded in establishing a “common-sense of belonging” that would not be 
eroded or lead to violence and chaos by any further transitions or efforts of political 
reform?” (Isaacs and Polese, 379).	
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
a) Impact of Soviet Union implosion on Central Asia 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union meant a reconfiguration of Russia’s links and 
relations with its former republics. The implosion rendered evident asymmetries and 
structural inequalities in what was the USSR. An unintended consequence of the 
implosion was the sudden independence of Central Asian countries. Prior to 1991 
there had been no signs of any emancipatory movement of whatever ideological 
inclination during the long Russian presence. Several terms have been coined to 
refer to this situation, among which “ ‘reluctant’ independent states” (Isaacs and 
Polese, 2015, 372). All of a sudden, the new leaderships in charge embarked in 
nation building and national identity narratives and also in a quest for legitimacy. The 
new ruling elites had to rely on the structures of the state they had inherited to 
develop their own supporting elements. For as Matveeva asserts “legitimacy, rests 
on several pillars which form the cornerstones of state ideologies, but the 
significance of these ingredients and their application varies across the region” 
(2009, 1099), and across countries. 
 
It can be considered that nation building has been a difficult endeavour, and in 
Tajikistan’s case it has been particularly complex and tortuous due to the very early 
civil war. The long Russian presence had weakened a sense of ethnie. This situation 
compounded by social strife put Tajikistan on the borderlines of collapsing 
(Heathershaw and Herzig, 2011, 5). Nonetheless, Rahmon Emomali, (from now 
	 6	
onwards referred to as Rahmon), in power since the end of 1992, has managed to 
gradually cement his grip on power.  
 
Such are some of the broad contextual elements behind Rahmon’s nation and 
national identity narratives, and his own role as architect of what is an undisputable 
top-down endeavour leading to his enshrining as the symbol of national unity and 
values.  
 
b) Tajikistan’s distinctiveness and research question’s pertinence 
 
Central Asia has been and continues to be an area of academic analysis and 
research, markedly so since the fall of the Soviet Union. Economic, political, 
geostrategic and security considerations have been some of the areas of interests. 
Linked to that, the religious factor, namely Islam and the risk of Islamic 
fundamentalism, has also been a topic of keen attention. Soviet implosion led 
analysts to speculate on the political orientation that the newly independent countries 
would adopt.  
 
From my perspective, Tajikistan is a paradoxical case: nearly a quarter of century 
after independence, indisputably autocratic, Tajikistan is still embarked in nation 
building and national identity construction. Politically and socioeconomically it has 
advanced little, and at one point it has even been on the brink of becoming a failed 
state (Buisson, 2007, 116) (McGlinchey, 2008, 4). The poorest of the five Central 
Asian countries, it has been the only one to have gone through a long civil war (1992-
1997), a subtle and not so subtle recurring theme in president Rahmon’s, public 
speeches.  
 
Incidentally, not many in-depth studies have centred exclusively on Tajikistan2. 
Rather the country has been an object of comparison focusing principally on the 
region’s political path and on its economic situation. Studies on the threat of Islamic 																																																								
2Heathershaw’s and Herzig’s book, The transformation of Tajikistan: The Sources of Statehood, 
(2011), and Bleuer’s and Nourzhanov’s book, Tajikistan: A political and social history, (2013) are the 
main publications which focused only on Tajikistan. 
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fundamentalism have also been undertaken (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2006). It seems 
evident that Tajikistan is not high in the international community’s agenda, both in 
political and economic terms, as more pressing conflict scenarios have emerged.  
 
The thesis strives to contribute to the argumentative discourse that sees Tajikistan as 
a country evolving from a soft to a hard autocracy (Nourzhanov, 2014) (Epkenhans, 
2015). It seeks to demonstrate that through its nation and national identity 
construction endeavours Rahmon is in the process of becoming a narrative of its 
own. In this regard, the thesis seeks to illustrate how, through the role played by the 
state’s structures, he purposefully pretends to embody national unity, values and 
symbols. To enhance legitimacy he engages in performative or great distractions 
politics. 
 
Having said that, the main purpose of the thesis will be to show what are the main 
axes in Rahmon’s nation building narratives, and how has he consolidated his grip on 
power and reinforced his autocratic regime. The thesis seeks to answer the following 
research question: How have Tajikistan’s nation building narratives and state 
structures rendered Rahmon the symbol of national unity? 
 
Perestroïka nourished political debate and, also, nascent and complex internal power 
struggles, with a political leadership far from being cohesive. In Rahmon’s words: “it 
is worth noting that the late 80s of the XX century saw the emergence of political 
forces that initiated the debates on nation-building issues [adding on the same topic 
that] however […] the themes of debate ultimately went far from being just an issue 
of nation-building and translated into the struggle for political power by some groups 
and forces.” (2012)3. Already in power, Rahmon “had to fight for his position in 
several serious challenges, mostly against his former allies.” (Epkenhans, 2016)4. 
Economic and political struggles accentuated social unrest resulting soon after 
independence in a protracted civil war.  
 
 																																																								
3 2012 National Unity speech: http://www.president.tj/en/node/2199 
4  Taken from Epkenhans’ mail, in which the author briefly presents Rahmon’s arrival and stay in 
power. 
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c) Literature review 
 
Soviet implosion gave lieu to concerns as to how Central Asian countries would 
evolve, in social, economic and political terms. The Soviet Union had been “nation-
makers” (Isaacs and Polese, 2015, 372)5 and now these nations that had not sought 
independence were confronted with the task of reinventing themselves, embarking 
on nation and national identity building. They have tried since to distant themselves 
from each other and from Russia (Fedorenko, Central Asia From Ethnic to Civic 
Nationalism, 2012). Central Asia, contrary to initial apprehension, did not undergo 
unmanageable social strife, except Tajikistan. In fact, civil war is a quasi permanent 
political reference in Rahmon’s discourses. After 25 years as an independent 
country, Tajikistan is still embarked on nation building and in its efforts to de-
emphasized its Soviet linkages. On this matter, according to Fragner (2001), Van 
Schendel and Zürcher (2001)6 Tajikistan has not quite succeeded in breaking up with 
“Soviet habits” (Fragner, 2001,13). It was the Soviet Union that outlined Tajikistan on 
ethno-territorial principles. Once independent, leadership felt it had to trace back in 
time and space its origins: the concept and the idea nation became central. 
 
For Smith, the ethnie is the precursor of the nation, and both have preserved their 
distinctive traits throughout time, the longue durée. Ethnie and nation possess 
identifiable features, myths, histories, culture, language and a sense of collective 
belonging (Guibernau, 2004) (Rezvani, 2013)7. For Buisson and Khusenova (in La 
production identitaire dans le Tadjikistan post-conflit : état des lieux (2011)) the 
concept of ethnie as a marker is a blurry: Central Asians, prior to independence, 
seemed to be more attached to local specificities (localism) rather than ethnic 
filiations. They did have a two-layered identity, and an underlying aim of Tajikistan’s 
																																																								
5 In Between “imagined” and “real” nation-building: Identities and nationhood in post-soviet central 
Asia (2015). 
6 Respectively in 'Soviet Nationalism': An Ideological Legacy to the Independent Republics of Central 
Asia (2001) and in Introduction: opting out, opting in, exclusion and assimilation: states and nations in 
the twentieth century (2001). 
7 Respectively in Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment (2004) and 
in Ethno-Territorial conflict and coexistence in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Fereydan (2013). 
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leadership has been to do away with this two-layered identity and anchor a real Tajik 
one.  
 
Nourzhanov’s and Bleuer’s book, Tajikistan, a Political and Social History (2013), 
gives a country’s overview from antiquity to civil war. It sketches Central Asia as a 
nomadic and sedentary multi-ethnic crossroad. It outlines Soviet states’ structures 
implantation and the coexistence of modern government structures with traditional 
ones. It underscores locals’ satisfaction with their social and living conditions as a 
Soviet republic and alludes to their perception of Perestroïka as a determinant 
disruptive factor, leading to political confrontation and civil war. McGlinchey, in 
Patronage, Islam, and the Rise of Localism in Central Asia (2008), maintains that the 
long-lasting Soviet period is viewed by Tajiks as a harmonious one. The Russians, 
he says, “are sorely missed” (2). Laruelle and Peyrouse, in their book Asie Centrale, 
la dérive autoritaire: cinq républiques entre héritage soviétique, dictature et Islam 
(2006) portray the socio-economic and political development of Central Asian 
republics since their independence. They highlight the efforts by the governing elites 
to hold on power. Nation and national identity building are the tools to achieve this 
aim. They are among the first in pointing out an authoritarian drift. Both authors 
highlight that the new ruling elites have heavily relied on the structures they inherited 
form the colonial period. 
 
The Transformation of Tajikistan, book coordinated by Heathershaw and Herzig 
(2011), gives a clear overview on statehood roots, Islam, national identity, and family 
structures. It tackles the question of security and Tajikistan’s place in the international 
community and it underlines the “resilience of Tajikistan” and statehood formation (6). 
Largely based on Weber’s definition of the modern state and state legitimacy, in the 
article State-Building, Power-Building and Political Legitimacy: The Case of Post-
Conflict Tajikistan (2007), Buisson explores the reconstruction of state-power. He 
refers to the consequences of the civil war on central authority, weakened by 
warlordism, very much still active in Rahmon’s government, who from the outset tried 
to give prominence to the Kulob region. Regionalism and warlordism are treated in 
depth by Nourzhanov in Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in 
Tajikistan (2005). Nourzhanov’s article is highly useful to understand Tajikistan’s 
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economic and political internal power struggles, a most important explanatory factor 
of civil war. 
 
Edited by M.Y. Omelicheva, Nationalism and Identity Construction in Central Asia: 
Dimensions, Dynamics, and Directions (2014) is a highly analytical book, parts of 
which closely relate to the subject proper of this thesis. Omelicheva discusses, along 
with other contributors, the nature and the dynamics of nationalism. She refers to the 
ongoing debates on the legitimacy process and collective belonging narratives. 
Specifically Nourzhanov’s contribution Nation-building and Islam in post-Soviet 
Tajikistan, tackles Rahmon’s political manipulation of Islam as practiced in Tajikistan, 
and more so with his efforts to eliminate the only credible opposition it has faced, the 
Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Closely related with the role of Islam in a 
secular society and its place in politics, Epkenhans in The Islamic Revival Party of 
Tajikistan: Episodes of Islamic Activism, Postconflict Accommodation, and Political 
Marginalization (2015) provides a most solid and comprehensive context where 
Islamic involvement originates and how it evolves into a political force, genuinely 
committed to pluralism and separation between state and religion. Epkenhans 
portrays Rahmon’s grip on Islamic bureaucracies and how he subordinates them to 
the state, neutralizing their disruptive potential, marginalizing the IRPT and paving 
the way for solidly cementing Rahmon’s autocracy. In his contribution to 
Omelicheva’s book, Hanks tackles in Identity Theft: Ethnosymbolism, Autochthonism, 
and Aryanism in Uzbek and Tajik National Narratives, the concept of national identity 
in a comparative manner: Tajikistan and Uzbekistan through the lens of 
ethnosymbolism, autochthonism and Aryanism 8 . Both countries’ leaderships 
contesting each other’s parameters and putting into question “historical legitimacy 
and ethnic superiority” (xxii). In the same vein, in Statehood as dialogue: historical 
narratives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (2013), Suyarkulova refers to “duelling 
identities”, inserting this competition in what she calls “historiography war” (162). It 
underlines the importance of statehood legitimacy as historians and politicians insist 
on demonstrating a link between “previous instances and the present” (173).  																																																								
8 Marat in Imagined past, uncertain future: The creation of national ideologies in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan (2008), and Laruelle in The Return of the Aryan Myth: Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized 
National Ideology, (2007), highlight the importance of Aryanism and Persian roots in Rahmon’s nation 
building narratives. 
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Still in the effort to distance itself from Uzbekistan and at the same time attempting to 
engrain a sense of national identity using an ancient and modern symbol which is 
water, Suyarkulova illustrates in Between national idea and international conflict: the 
Roghun HHP as an anti colonial endeavor, body of the nation, and national wealth, 
(2014) the Tajik-Uzbek dispute on nation and identity building through the Rogun 
dam. She suggests that the dam may well become the metaphor of the state and a 
contributor to Rahmon’s legitimacy. In Building a nation through a dam: the case of 
Rogun in Tajikistan (2015), Menga asserts that it has became an “ideology” of its 
own and another national identity marker. Both scholars point out the internal and 
external functions of Rogun. At another level Cariou, in L’eau en Asie Centrale: 
Enjeux et défis contemporains (2015) underscores Rogun’s symbolic dimension and 
the cult it may generate. Recognized the dam’s potential benefits and seen as a 
narrative in its own right and as a symbol of modern Tajikistan, Rogun is also a 
grandiose performative project. On her part, Matveeva underscores the legitimacy 
function of those performative policies (in Legitimising central Asian authoritarianism: 
Political manipulation and symbolic power, 2009). These performative distractions 
are always top-down initiatives. Isaacs and Polese highlight that nation building is 
always undertaken by “elites” (2015). 
 
The literature consulted focuses largely on nation and nation identity building and 
related issues and, to a lesser degree, on specific topics such as historical roots, 
water, the role of Islam. Yet not in-depth studies on current political leadership, 
Rahmon in particular, have been produced, or on Rahmon as the uncontested 
national unity symbol. The aim of the thesis is to contribute to and spark a debate on 
Rahmon’s undisputed autocratic leadership.  
 
d) Methodology and Research Limitations 
 
Methodology 
The thesis will be anchored in an inductive theory, centred on three premises 
formulated herein, with a view to identify the constituent pillars upon which Rahmon’s 
has articulated an idea of nation and of common identity. Related to that, it will 
illustrate the thematic linkages between the various narratives. To this end and so as 
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to tackle the research question, it will seek to demonstrate that through his nation 
building and national identity endeavours, Rahmon is in the process of becoming a 
narrative of its own. The thesis will strive to prove how, through the role played by the 
state’s structures, he has become the embodiment of national unity, values and 
symbols.  
Two main historical markers permeate the thesis: the Soviet Union implosion and to 
a large degree the civil war. This is largely the context in which this thesis is set. As 
nation building is an as yet unfinished task, the narratives contain Rahmon’s 
references as late as 2016. The narratives are anchored on two main pillars: the idea 
of nation and common identity, concepts that are at the heart of major theories on 
nation building.  
 
Main concepts: ethnie, nation, nation building, national identity, ethnosymbolism, 
state, nation-state. 
Main indicators: Myths, ethnic roots, national boundaries, societal values, religion, 
political consciousness, cultural cohesiveness, colonialism, civil war, autocracy,  
Sources: official speeches, state news agencies, official publications, and interviews. 
As the thesis makes clear that from the outset, nation identity narratives have been a 
top-down task, the following premises are framed in that logic.  
Main premises:  
1. Tajikistan’s viability has rested on Rahmon’s ability to affirm his power and 
weave national identity narratives, and a sense of common belonging;  
 
2. Narratives had to be anchored in distinct ancient roots to insert Tajikistan in 
modernity and to distance Tajikistan from its Soviet past and from civil strife.  
 
3. In Tajikistan’s autocratic regime state structures made possible Rahmon’s 
enshrinement as the symbol of national unity. 
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Argumentative and support materials are drawn from Rahmon’s speeches, 
statements, media articles and newscasts. They were taken from the presidential 
website: www.president.tj, state media agencies: www.khovar.tj and www.avesta.tj. 
They deal mostly with speeches to Parliament, Independence Day, National Unity 
Day, New Year’s, Mother’s Day, and religious celebrations such as Navruz (Persian 
Spring and New Year). Quotations in the thesis were taken verbatim from the English 
texts published in the official channels referred above. I translated from Russian 
those materials only available in that language. Secondary sources refer to academic 
articles, books and journals, and articles from Central Asian and European 
newspapers. International organizations as well as NGOs’ (WB, RSF) underlined 
various angles concerning Tajikistan’s economic and socio-political development. 
 
Limitations 
During the last few years Tajikistan has become a more hermetic country. As a result 
academic and journalistic publications are scarce and field access to researches is 
increasingly difficult. It must be underlined the increased difficulty of local journalist 
and researchers to freely exert their professions. Rahmon’s uncontested tight grip on 
power impacts freedom of expression and, therefore, research work and the 
production of alternative analysis. Unsurprisingly then the access to Tajik media is 
more difficult as several websites have been shut down, and media venues such as 
Ozodagon and Nigoh are very difficult to access. Knowledge of Tajik language could 
have been helpful to grasp Rahmon’s vision of his nation, as presumably reflected in 
Tajikistan in the mirror of history (2001). 
 
e) Chapter Review  
 
The thesis is organised into three main chapters and a brief conclusion wrapping up 
its subject proper.  
 
Chapter 2 sets the theoretical framework. As Rahmon has made every effort to 
underline and demonstrate Tajikistan’s presumed uniqueness, this chapter outlines 
the features of the nation, and the role symbols and values, as articulated by the 
main currents of thought on these matters: primordialism and modernism. 
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Throughout his stay in power Rahmon has invested himself in instilling in Tajiks an 
idea of nation and of common belonging, a complex task particularly when Tajikistan, 
nation and state, was ‘invented’ by external actors. In this case, the research of 
ethnic markers identified as national symbols are central to the nation building 
process. 
 
Chapter 3 contextualises Rahmon’s main nation and national identity building 
narratives; a first section deals with the revival of Persian and Aryan roots; a second 
one, Rogun dam, which is both ancient and modern, aims at detonating and 
enhancing Tajikistan’s weight and presence in the region; a third section pertains to 
the place of Islam in an officially secular society, underlining Rahmon’s efforts to 
neutralise Islamic influence and marginalise political opposition. Through these 
sections, the chapter aims at illustrating Rahmon’s gradual autocratic consolidation, 
thematic performative policies playing a key role. 
 
Chapter 4 illustrates how Rahmon’s narratives become a platform that projects him 
as the Leader that brought peace to the nation, and the one that set the foundation of 
modern Tajikistan. It seeks to demonstrate how through the role of state 
apparatuses, and the support of key public figures, he has been enshrined as the 
hero and symbol of national unity and values, for many the Father of the Nation. 
 
Finally, the last section presents brief concluding remarks as related to the thesis’ 
premises and to the research question. It suggests areas for further academic 
research.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
As the thesis’s underlying argument revolves around Tajikistan’s nation and national 
identity construction, understood here as an ongoing process, this chapter sketches 
first the context in which the concepts of nation and state were conceived and 
applied under the Soviet regime, that is the Soviets as nation makers. It also briefly 
outlines how nation building was to be undertaken by the new ruling elites; it is then 
centred on what are considered the two major currents of thought on these subject 
matters: primordialism and modernism. It will subsequently centre on a key element 
for primordialists and modernists, ethnosymbolism, fundamental in national identity 
construction. This theoretical approach centres on the role presumably played by 
symbols, values and perceptions in the individual’s imaginary on the nation 
(Omelicheva, 2014) (Hanks, 2014). Although largely differing in their assumptions, 
argumentations and conclusions, for primordialists and modernists alike, symbols 
and values perform key functions in nation building.  
 
a) Political independence and nation building  
 
It is worth underlining that Central Asia countries were the very last in ‘declaring’ 
independence from what until then had been the Soviet Union. Quoting Olscotts, 
Nourzhanov, among others, talks of a “freedom more forced on [Central Asian 
countries] than acquired or won” (2005, 111). Those countries reflect most unusual 
realities: independence was granted by the former colonial power, the very one that 
had designed their territories and assigned what ethnie would be the titular nation 
and what would be the national language, the one that had created the state 
structures (Omelicheva, 2014) (Rezvani, 2013) (Buisson and Khusenova, 2011). In 
this connection, van Schendel and Zürcher highlight that “Middle East and Central 
Asia offer the most striking early twentieth century examples of how political 
structures were created first and a national consciousness underpinning these new 
political units was constructed afterwards” (2001, 1). Indeed various researchers see 
Central Asian post-Soviet nationalism as a continuation, as a footprint of Soviet 
national delimitation policy (Fragner, 2001, 13-14) (Omelicheva, 2014, xiv). Allouche 
maintains that “this process of nation building initiated by the soviets changed the 
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map of the region by transforming former amorphous ethnic groups into distinct titular 
nations with identifiable eponymous territories.” (2005, 190).  
 
Central Asian countries suddenly became politically independent without a prior deep 
cultural and national identity consciousness, and without a significant awareness of 
major historical national figures. The unearthing of important historical actors has 
been undertaken by the ruling elites, thus rendering nation building and national 
identity construction a top-down endeavour. In fact, as it has been mentioned, there 
is consensus that identity narratives invariably are imposed from above, with little 
saying and inputs from those in the receiving end (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2006) 
(Cummings, 2010). Basically this translates into imposed public policies and official 
discourse, with scant attention paid to the degree of acceptance or rejection by 
ordinary citizens, and non-state actors (Menga, 2015). Isaacs and Polese go as far 
as affirming that “nation-building can only be proposed by elites but [that this still 
would] need to be accepted (or renegotiated/rejected) by those who have a say in the 
construction of a national identity and who are an integrated aspect of the nation-
building process” (2015, 372). This being said, it can also be argued that nation and 
national identity narratives have been targeted to a rather passive and captive nation-
audience. In any event, even before the official accession to independence 
(09/09/1991), the main challenge was to retrieve and unearth from its ancient 
ancestry’s tree the constituent elements, building blocks, upon which to build and 
engrain in the ethnies a deep idea of nation and of national identity. This being said, 
it can also be argued that nation and national identity narratives have been targeted 
to a rather passive and captive audience.  
 
From a different angle, it can be argued that national identity construction has also 
signified elite power building and specifically power consolidation of those at the reins 
of the state apparatuses. National identity narratives have become a most visible 
promotion platform for those at the helm and in charge of conducting the nation’s 
affairs. Indeed, from the available evidence, the power dynamics and the increasingly 
autocratic manner in which it is exercised seems to suggest that Rahmon, the 
indisputable Leader, is in the process of becoming part of the national identity 
narrative.  
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b) Nation and state concepts as viewed by primordialists and modernists  
 
Central Asia’s political independence rendered evident how imprecise frontier setting 
and country design had been. The grandiose attempt by the Communist regime to 
create a Soviet nation and instil Soviet nationalism, left a profound imprint in the 
sudden new countries, and rendered their task particularly complex: disengagement 
from the ex-colonial power, and reinventing a national identity. Tajikistan’s case 
illustrates the relevance of concepts such as ethnie, nation, state, nation-state and 
nationalism. It also highlights the arguments advanced and debated by primordialism 
and modernism. 
 
Nation and state, functionally interlinked, are two distinct conceptual instruments. 
They refer and deal with separate realities, each one with its own specificities and 
contextual borderlines. A persistent and enriching debate goes on regarding the main 
currents of thought on these subjects (Gibernau, 2004) (Rezvani, 2013) (Hanks, 
2014) (Omelicheva, 2014). After the Soviet Union implosion, the new political 
configuration in Central Asia rendered evident the importance of those concepts. For 
instance, where does the nation find its roots? To what extent the state has 
succeeded or not in instilling and strengthening national identity?  
 
For Rezvani, for instance, the nation, as a concept, is closely linked to the ethnic 
group. He views it as “a community whose members subjectively feel that they 
belong together” (2013, 36). A nation may be made-up of one or several ethnic 
groups. A state is a territorial entity, and is to be understood as “the political 
organization of a nation”, in other words the “state is the territorial manifestation of a 
nation” (2013, 36). 
 
In what it relates to nationalism Rezvani defines it “as a process of ethnic groups 
becoming nations and, more so, a process of nations building a state” (2013, 41). 
Nationalism refers markedly to a sentiment or awareness of belonging. In what it 
relates to ongoing identity construction, Central Asian nationalisms are similar to 
those articulated by the “Soviet social engineers’ approach to building a nation-state“ 
(Omelicheva, 2014, xv). Upon independence, the new leaderships embarked on “the 
formation of new national identities” (ibid), as a way to gain legitimacy. In that sense 
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post Soviet ruling elites have actively implicated themselves in this process to 
enhance their grip on power. Towards this aim they “use the ideology of ethnic 
nationalism” (ibid). 
 
In what it concerns the concept of state, drawing on Weber’s definition, for 
Guibernau, the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (2004, 131). Whereas 
nation is to be understood as “a human group conscious of forming a community, 
sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a 
common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself” 
(2004, 132). She maintains equally that there can be nations without states, not the 
opposite, and that the “nation-state is a modern institution, defined by the formation 
of a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of 
force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by 
means of cultural homogenization” (2004, 132).  
 
Among the variants on the definition of the modern state, Rezvani succinctly asserts 
that “a state is the political organization of a nation [and that] states are territorial 
entities”, which can only exercise their power within their boundaries (2013, 36). 
However Heathershaw points out that nowadays state’s boundaries are not confined 
to its formal given territory (2013, 43). External actors, such as international 
organizations, have a direct impact on the state. Buisson, on his part, maintains that 
the state is not a “neutral and integrative structure, but a source of conflict as well as 
a creation of power” (2007, 120). 
 
Although aware of the various approaches, definitions and debate on ethnicity, nation 
and national identity, from my vantage point it is Anthony D. Smith’s definition of 
ethnie and nation that best apply to Tajikistan’s nation-building narratives. They 
highlight the logic of official discourse concerning the construction of Tajik national 
identity. According to Smith, ethnies are “human populations with shared ancestry 
myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a 
sense of solidarity” (1986, 32)9. From that perspective, nationhood would be its 																																																								
9 in (Guibernau, 2004, 126). 
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logical development, its expected corollary. Put another way, for all practical 
purposes ethnies would be the precursor of the nation, as there would be a line of 
continuity throughout time and space. For Smith, a nation is “a named community 
possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public 
culture and common laws and customs” (2002, 15)10. 
 
In the view of the primordialists, dimensions such as antiquity and ubiquity are 
essential in the making of a nation, a line of continuity and territoriality where 
individuals develop and nurture a shared sense of belonging, of identifiable markers 
(Hanks, 2014, 112). As Anderson puts it, a nation is an “imagined community”, 
apparently immaterial, subjective yet referring always also to a multidimensional 
reality where the people share the conviction and feeling of being part of the same 
group (Allouche, 2005, 104) (Heathershaw and Herzig, 2011, 10).  
 
For modernists, on the other hand, nations are the product or outcome of the 
industrial revolution, of modernisation, the very emergence of mass means of 
communication. In their view, concepts such as culture and ethnicity are of lesser 
importance (Rezvani, 2013, 39) (Hanks, 2014, 112). Nations are a “social and 
cultural construct with limited spatial and demographic extent”, clearly identifiable 
traits in the Central Asian context (Menga, 2015, 479). 
 
It seems reasonable to affirm that Smith’s definitions of ethnie and nation are clearly 
interlocked. They are useful for the understanding of how territoriality was determined 
and imposed upon ethnic groups by the Soviet power. Once independence was 
declared, it was precisely upon myths, ancestral roots, culture, shared memories and 
values that Central Asian states have anchored the nation building narratives. 
 
This was necessary in at least two respects: on the one hand, the viability of the 
newly independent countries required a solid social support base. Tajikistan’s ruling 
elite has sought to instil in the population a conviction of its uniqueness, and of it 
ancient past, what Cummings has called “internally invented signs of national 
certainty” (2009, 1083). On the other hand, the very viability of the ruling elites has 																																																								
10 in (Guibernau, 2004, 127) 
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depended on their success in nation building or if preferred nation make-believe. 
Legitimacy enhancement has been part of the national identity construction process.  
 
c) Ethnosymbolism, nationalism and national identity 
 
Ethnosymbolism is central for the understanding of nation building and national 
identity constructions. It assigns high relevance to myths, traditions, symbols and 
values. These are articulated, conveyed, shared and modified throughout time. 
Hanks (2014) suggests that ethnosymbolism does not necessarily negate the 
importance played by societal development, modernity for instance. On another 
angle of that vast topic, there is common agreement that national identity is 
multidimensional. It includes culture, language, territory and religion among other 
features. 
 
For primordialists, a shared sense of belonging to a nation is inextricably linked to the 
array of ‘markers’ that a nation possesses. From this perspective symbols and values 
are at the root of ethnic or national identity. National identity construction is part of an 
ongoing process, part and parcel of a historical continuity. Viewed from this 
perspective, a central element in national identity is a keen sense of awareness on 
the part of an individual or a member of a group. In this vein, nationalism would be an 
expression of identification with the nation. The nation, in the primoridalists’ view, 
does not emerge in a particular point in time, as sustained by modernists. It has 
matured and continues to evolve over the course of time, what has been termed the 
longue durée. Ethnosymbolism, according to Omelicheva, would be a connecting 
theoretical approach between primordialists and modernists. She maintains that 
ethnosymbolism “emphasizes the significance of symbols, traditions, values, and 
myths that go into the making and preservation of nations, while recognizing that 
national identity is shaped by the political and economic forces in which it develops” 
(Omelicheva, 2014, x).  
 
National identity presumes the existence of sentiments of closeness, and of 
belonging to a nation. For Bölükbaşi, then, nationalism refers to a “broad symbol 
which entails values and goals that make it worthy of notice and acceptance.” (2001, 
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35). In this line of thinking and from my perspective, symbols and values, immaterial 
as they are, are conveyed and felt as being deeply connected with the notion of 
territoriality that contains the nation. People identify themselves as part of a given 
territory, symbolized by specific traditions, cultural attributes and bonded by what 
Jahangari calls “a sense of local pride” (1995, 35). 
 
Along those lines, Omelicheva maintains that national territories awaken “a sentiment 
or consciousness of belonging to the nation.” (2014, ix). In this broad context, for 
primordialists, nationalism is closely linked to ideological construction and sentiments 
of social, cultural and political identification. It evolves from the nation, itself part and 
parcel of a historical constitutive process not circumscribed to a specific clear-cut 
historical moment or historical juncture. In contrast, for modernists nationalism 
emerges with the advent of modernity.  
 
Symbols and myths provide an immaterial shelter. They have the capacity to 
influence and to instil in people a certainty or a sense of common belonging, and they 
considered the pillars of the nation. Thus symbols and myths must be unearthed by 
the political elites, to serve as a common historical basis that “would be accessible to 
the mass public” (Marat, 2008, 12). Heathershaw and Montgomery maintain that 
“myths are not incidental” (2014, 3). In fact, they are “a legitimating device for the 
militant secularism of weak regimes” (2014, 1). Not surprisingly then, myth 
magnification or even distortion has been a feature in national identity narratives. 
Indeed they may contribute to enhance the leadership’s legitimacy.  
 
Ruling elites engage therefore in projecting an always glorious past, national traits 
and attributes, anything that can contribute to forge a sense of historical and 
territorial belonging. From this perspective nation and identity building has meant the 
construction of connecting venues between their new political realities and a singular, 
distinct common past. To gain in effectiveness nation building narratives included 
also the recuperation of language, as the most important gluing element. In the 
process, it has allowed the new independent countries to formally disengage 
themselves from their recent past, at a linguistic level. Tajikistan declared Tajik the 
official national language.  
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Chapter 3:  Rahmon’s national identity narratives 
 
As far back as the Tsarist period the notion of national identity was an elusive one. 
Kucera points out that such a notion was inexistent: “when Russian Orientalist 
scholars arrived in the region […] after Central Asia’s conquest by the tsarist empire, 
they were confounded by the fact that identity in Central Asia did not conform to their 
expectations of nationality or ethnicity” (2013). He quotes Russian ethnographer 
Vasiliy Bartold’s as saying that “the settled population of Central Asia think of 
themselves primarily as Muslims, and think of themselves as only secondarily living 
in a particular town or district; to them the idea of belonging to a particular people is 
of no significance” (2013). Localism was the main component of the people’s identity 
in the region. The inhabitants were deeply attached to their place of birth, 
geographical locations the mountainous and lowland regions (Buisson and 
Khusenova, 2011, 98). In that line Zarubi notes that as recent as the 1900s Uzbeks 
“called themselves Turks. But their Turkmen and Kyrgyz neighbors call them ‘Sart,’ a 
word they also use [to designate] Tajiks.”11 
 
Soviet implosion led Central Asian countries to a disengagement from Moscow and 
to a process of nation and identity building, for if “Soviet authorities [had taken] upon 
themselves to become ‘nation-makers’ “(Isaacs and Polese, 2015, 372), they were 
not identity builders. The construction of national identity implies, of necessity, a 
lengthy process: “identities [are] constructed” overtime (Fedorenko, 2012, 4). 
 
This chapter will look then at Rahmon’s ‘toolkit’ in nation national identity narratives 
as illustrated by three recurrent themes: a) Aryanism, Zoroastrianism, and the 
Samanids, distinct historical markers; b) Rogun dam, a modern nation identifier that 
combines the symbolic attributes ascribed to water and its potentiality as detonator of 
economic growth and national assertiveness; c) Islam in a secular context.  
 
 
 
																																																								
11 In (Kucera, 2013), see http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2014-where-have-all-the-jobs-
gone/tajikistans-dream/ 
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a) The unearthing of ‘Tajik’ roots: the Samanids, Zoroastrianism and Aryanism 
 
The efforts undertaken to re-establish linkages with Persian and other ancient roots, 
have served Rahmon in his endeavours to undermining Islam’s centrality. In the 
Samanid period, for instance, he highlights the importance they attached to 
statehood. On Hanafism, he underlines Imam Abu Hanifa’s attachment to state as 
separate from religion. He also gives high centrality to Navruz. Rahmon’s public 
interventions on these subjects deemphasize Islam’s importance. He blames in a 
veiled and not so veiled manner political opposition linking it to Islamic radicalism. 
Almost without exceptions all Rahmon’s public interventions are axed on unity, self-
awareness, national unity, national security, millenary ancestry, strong statehood, 
national values and symbols, Tajiks’ generosity and endurance. 
 
Rahmon started to unearth, to manipulate and appropriate some historical narratives 
in order to create an “imaginary of the nation” (Isaacs and Polese, 2015, 376). For 
over 25 years, he emerges as the only visible Tajik national identity architect, subtly 
engraining in his captive audience the perception that he incarnates independence, 
that he knows and shows the path towards national unity. 
 
Rahmon’s nation’s main constituent elements are to be found in his book The Tajiks 
in the Mirror of History (1999), preceded, three year earlier, by an article by the same 
title, and are identified in three interlaced historical markers: the Samanids, 
Zoroastrianism and Aryanism (Laruelle, 2007) (Suyarkulova, 2013, 166-168). 
Tajikness is thus placed above the concept of territoriality: they refer to ancient 
culture, ethnie, language, and religious dimension (Buisson and Khusenova, 2011, 
101-103) (Nourzhanov and Bleuer, 2013). The book “explains how traditions and 
historic concepts very much continue to shape much of Tajikistan’s modern history 
[and it] gives a very personal view on the history and identity as it is felt and 
experienced by the modern Tajik, whose roots lie in deep in the Persianate culture 
and history.” (Overlaet, 2014). In any event, the rewriting of historical narratives aims 
at highlighting Tajikistan’s ancient roots, preserved overtime. Rahmon is insistent on 
Tajiks’ Persian roots and invites them to “regard the history of our nation like a pure 
and holy mirror” (Yountchi, 2011, 228). Navruz has become in Rahmon’s national 
identity narrative a central marker.  
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The Samanid period 
Rahmon’s narratives highlight the Samanid period as a glorious chapter in Tajiks 
history, and as a symbol of strong statehood. It is not a coincidence that two years 
after the end of the civil war he declared 1999 as the 1,100-year anniversary of the 
Samanid dynasty (897-907), an 11-meter statue of Amir Ismail Somoni was erected 
in Dushanbe to be revered as a national symbol (Buisson, 2008), and as a symbol of 
Tajikistan’s golden age and of national unity (Hanks, 2014, 121). By reinterpreting 
this period and by linking it to the present Rahmon establishes Tajikistan’s linkages 
with Persian culture (Suyarkulova, 2013, 167). In 2000 it adopted the somoni as the 
national currency (Buisson, 2008). It is since then a national emblem according to 
Khovar.tj. For the Tajik regime, national awareness emerged during the Samanids. In 
his 2013 Independence speech, Rahmon asserted that “[he was] convinced that for 
Tajikistan the XXI century [will be] as glorious as during Samanid epoch, [it] will be 
the century of independent Tajikistan and the era of outstanding progress of our 
ancient people.” 12 
 
The unearthing and revival of the Samanids has another reading: this golden age 
was one characterised by a strong statehood. In contrast, Islamic opposition views it 
as a great period of Islam (Nourzhanov, 2014, 85) (Epkenhans, 2015, 342). For the 
regime, Tajiks under the Samanids must be seen as a lesson of national unity, 
independence and national awareness. As it was noted above, these themes are 
recurrent in his 2013 Independence day speech13 and in many others.  
 
Zoroastrianism  
In the same logic of identifying Tajikness in ancient times, Rahmon has embarked on 
establishing linkages with the Zoroastrian period, (628-551 B.C.) and implicitly 
deemphasising Islam. He views Zoroaster as “the first Prophet […] and the spiritual 
leader and guide of the Tajik people” (Laruelle, 2007, 54). In 2001, Avesta and the 
																																																								
12 see http://www.president.tj/en/node/5066 
13 In his Independence speech, in 2013, Rahmon stated that the Tajiks should make sure “that 
independence along with the “people”, “homeland” and “unity” turns into an indivisible concept of 
existence, consciousness, philosophy and the fundamental value of life of every citizen of the country.”  
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worldwide civilization14, a collection of sacred Zoroastrian texts, was presented. He 
declared that year as Avesta’s 2 700-anniversary. In 2003 the Tajik-UNESCO’s book 
From Songs of Zarathustra to Melodies of Borbad was published, the same year 
when UNESCO officialised the “3000th Anniversary of the Zoroastrian Civilization” 
(Blakkirsud and Nozimova, 2010, 187). 
 
Zoroastrianism has been portrayed as a ‘national religion’, thus diminishing the 
importance of Islam in Tajik society. Up until 2000, the seven stars on the Tajik flag 
contained Zoroastrian symbols. In an as yet unexplained change they now represent 
the seven sociocultural centres of the country (Buisson and Khusenova, 2011, 110). 
Both, king Somoni, elevated to the rank of national hero and the revival of 
Zoroastrianism have enabled Rahmon to make a case for the existence of Aryan 
roots in the Tajik population: “Ismail Somoni remained unfailingly faithful […] to the 
elements of Aryan statehood” (Laruelle, 2007, 54).  
 
Aryanism  
In his efforts to underline Tajikistan’s Aryan roots, Rahmon declared 2006 Aryan 
Culture Year. It was meant to be the revival of the “great culture of the Aryan people” 
(Lenta.ru, 2005)15. Having no qualms with any incongruity or with being plainly 
wrong, in The Tajiks in the Mirror of History, Rahmon affirms that the: “The word 
‘Tajik’ is a synonym of the word ‘Aryan’, which means generous and noble. Modern 
Tajik language identifies this word with ‘having a crown’ and ‘peace loving people’ ” 
(Marat, 2008, 21). By putting Aryanism at the forefront the regime seeks to portray 
Tajikistan as a humanist, pacifist and an entirely modern nation. Rahmon mentioned 
in 2011 that “the Aryan civilization, spiritual heritage of [our] ancestors who built [our] 
culture is one of the roots of the world civilization”16. In his nation building narratives, 
he makes total abstraction of the diverse ethnic minorities within Tajikistan. 
Suyarkulova argues that Tajik historiography is based on ethnic claims, which “looks 
beyond the borders” of the current Tajik state and that seems to reveal the idea of a 
“lost ‘promised land’ of the ancestral homeland” (2013, 162).  																																																								
14 The original version being: Avesta i mirovaya tsivilizatsiya. Dushanbe: Akademiya Nauk Respubliki 
Tadzhikistan, 2001. 
15 See https://lenta.ru/news/2005/12/09/rahmonov/ 
16 See the 2011 Independence speech at http://www.president.tj/en/node/2559 
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It seems rather clear that in the narratives it permeates an effort at “ethnic 
homogeneisation” (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2006, 82). This underlying intention has 
been accentuated by the linguistic politics, as Tajik is the sole national language, 
springing in Samarkand, Bukhara, Tajikistan’s historical fiefdoms (Buisson and 
Khusenova, 2011, 98). In Rahmon’s vision, the Tajik nation is understood as 
comprised of an ancestral ethnie, a unique language, a central state in a delimited 
territory. These four elements (language, ethnie, state and territorial borders) to 
which Smith and others allude as constituents of a nation, were present already 
under the Soviet Union (Guibernau, 2004) (Omelicheva, 2014). 
 
Rahmon sees in all these celebrations a chance to “promote the development and 
intensification of self-awareness, national unity and patriotic pride” (2006)17. During 
the 2006 New Year’s speech he insisted that these celebrations are meant to prove 
the “sacred, scientific and historical values of the civilised Tajik people” and that its 
ancient culture is clearly different from Uzbekistan’s Turkic roots. These narratives 
“place the Tajik ethnie much earlier in Central Asia than any proto-Turkic/Uzbek 
presence” (Hanks, 2014, 123). 
 
Rahmon highlights the importance of Aryanism and Zoroastrianism so as to distance 
them from Turkic influence and, in passing, it underscores antiquity and secularity. 
Suyarkulova points out that by underlining the roots dimension Rahmon seeks to 
portray the sedentary Tajiks as the “indigenous people of the region” (2013, 165), yet 
culturally interlinked with other cultures and regions such as Kurds, Iranians, 
Afghans, Indians and Europeans. He affirms that “in the span of their long history the 
Tajiks made a substantial contribution to the world culture” (1999, 109)18. He makes 
obvious abstraction of other ethnies living in that Soviet designed country, Uzbeks for 
instance. 
 
Rahmon is not alone in this approach. Soviet scholars such as Bobodzhan Gafurov 
had already underlined the link between Aryanism and Tajikistan. He had tried to 
prove the antiquity of the Tajik people (Laruelle, 2007) (Hanks, 2014). In his 2004 																																																								
17 See 2006 Speech to the Parliament at http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/10611 
18 In (Marat, 2008, 20) 
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national independence speech Rahmon said that Gafurov “had practically 
established the tradition of modern Tajik people […]. This tradition proves that we 
Tajiks do not have any needs for rewriting of the history.”19  
 
It is worth noting that, in official discourse and celebrations, these narratives are quite 
recurrent prior to elections, which renders them highly political. They were clearly 
abundant in 2006. That year several publications were released- all dedicated to 
Rahmon’s national identity narratives such as Emomali Rahmon: Year of Culture 
That Conquered the World and Emomali Rahmon: The Year of the Aryan Civilization 
(Marat, 2008, 20). Rahmon’s insistence on Tajiks’ ancestral roots, their inscription in 
the political calendar must also be seen as part of his power building process, and 
especially as permanent legitimacy tools. In time all this will lead to he becoming the 
national unity symbol, of which he is the guarantor, aware that “in the course of [its] 
history the Tajik nation has been confronted by all sorts of vehement opponents who 
doubted its very existence” (Rahmon, 1999)20. 
 
This idea is still very present in his speeches: Tajikistan survived due to the strength 
and sense of unity of Tajiks. However the dangers are still there and the people of 
Tajikistan must be unified, be patriotic and implicitly stay behind the Leader, a highly 
recurrent advise in his speeches to the young generations. In a variation on the same 
theme, in his 2015 National Unity speech, Rahmon recalled that “in order to destroy a 
country, it is enough to destroy its languages and culture”21, thus the importance to 
recognise and identify with their cultural ancestors. It is pertinent to recall that 
Rahmon is highly selective: he underlines Tajik greatness and only by inference he 
refers to a crucial chapter in Tajikistan’s history, the civil war. On that angle, 
Matveeva is blunt: “the major gap in Rahmon’s ideology is that it does not provide an 
official, plausible interpretation of the history of the 1992-1997 war” (2009, 1107). 
And this position is reflected particularly in the education (since the 2000s): historical 
books vaguely mention the 1992-1997 episode (Roche, 2013). At times it seems an 
intended political amnesia. The regime’s reinterpretation of history as the foundation 																																																								
19 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2568 
20In Kalder’s article (2009) at https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2009/dec/04/dictator-lit-
emomalii-rahmon-tajikistan 
21 See http://president.tj/en/node/9242 
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of nation building and national identity construction a top-down exercise where the 
targeted audience plays a passive role, something proper of an increasingly 
autocratic regime, where the leader dictates the course, and where the young 
generations do not have enough historical references to feel and be part of what 
Rahmon insistently tries to instil. This reinterpretation underscoring Rahmon’s role in 
the peace-making process helps him also to delegitimize other competing political 
actors, mainly the IRPT.  
 
In the end, in Rahmon’s narratives, symbols and myths are of essence, and they 
encompass more than flags, anthems, emblems and currency. Internally, symbols 
perpetuate the idea of nation, and project it externally. Myths are therefore essential 
to foster a common cultural and historical ground. They are, what Armstrong has 
categorised as mythomoteur. This mythomoteur is a system that centres on myths 
and “heroic figures from antiquity, which defines the historical and cultural 
parameters of identity” (Hanks, 2014, 113). The purpose of such a system is to 
associate the ethnic populations with a homeland and all that which it entails.  
 
Seemingly Rahmon’s purpose has been to set up a framework in which the people of 
Tajikistan feel and affirm their common identity. The incumbent dug out mythological 
narratives in order to cement ethnic symbols: the presumed intrinsic connection with 
Aryanism, Zoroastrianism and the Samanid empire rendered Tajiks unique and pure 
in the region. The question still remains as to how effective those narratives are: 
symbols and myths gain in efficiency if the people can interpret them and appropriate 
them (Cummings, 2010). And as Matveeva (2009) points out, symbolism is political 
as it reveals how state leaders perform in front of their audience and underscores the 
efficiency of performative narratives, clearly displayed throughout Rahmon’s nation 
building narratives, and by means of the celebration and inscription in the cultural, 
thus political, calendar. 
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b) Water as a modern national identity narrative: Rogun dam 
      
“Rogun is our all - motherland, faith, future, unity.”  (Rahmon, 2010)22  
 
Rahmon has anchored his narratives on nation building and national identity on 
Tajikistan’s millenary roots.  Rogun dam, a narrative in the making, comprises in itself 
the attributes of a timeless symbol, water, and the potentiality of detonating economic 
development. A top-down project, if and when completed, it may be a public work 
that may strengthen national identity and, through this performative initiative, 
enhance legitimacy.  
 
Paradoxically, in its origins, Rogun is an unfinished Soviet project. For Central Asia 
water is central. The Syr and the Amu Darya rivers, originating in the Pamir region 
are the backbone of water politics (Kushkumbayev and Kushkumbayeva, 2013, 212). 
The ‘cross-bordering’ characteristic of water resources is reflected in the two clear-
cut position between the upstream (Uzbekistan mainly, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan) and downstream countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). 
 
As the least developed country, poor in raw materials, yet rich in water resources, 
Rahmon has rendered its management and ownership a national development issue. 
International, regional, bilateral agreements, committees and meetings proliferate: 
the 1992 Agreement on Cooperation in Joint Management Use and Protection of 
Water Resources of Inter-State Sources; the statute of the Interstate Coordination 
Water Commission (ICWC), created in 1992, focused on water management 
solutions (Central Eurasia Standard, 2013, 6). Yet, unsolved difficulties stall water 
energy projects (Kushkumbayev and Kushkumbayeva, 2013, 212). Rahmon seeks to 
make of water Tajikistan’s economic detonator, thus his insistence in re-launching 
Rogun.23  
																																																								
22 In (Féaux de la Croix and Suyarkulova, 2015, 115) 
 
23 Average surface water flow is about 64km3 per year. Tajikistan uses about 18% of the flow 
originated in its territory and it is used in agriculture: It provides up to 90% for agricultural production( 
Asian Development Bank, 2013). This sector represents 20% of Tajikistan’s GDP and absorbs 53% of 
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In addition to ancient roots nation building narratives, from the second half of the past 
decade, water began to occupy a central place in his official and public 
pronouncements. Aware of its economic and political potential, at the discursive level 
Rahmon started to appropriate water and to make of it a Tajik feature. As early as 
2008 he said that “hydropower engineering is the main wealth of [the] country” 
(2008) 24 . Years later, on the same theme he affirmed that Tajikistan’s future 
“depends on effective and wise use of hydro-power, since only energy security can 
give considerable impetus to developing and expansion of all economic spheres of 
Tajikistan” (2011)25. Water became a multi-value good in economic and political 
terms, an instrument to enhance nation building and to widen and cement his power 
base, a keystone in his efforts to be seen as the real independence maker, the main 
articulator of national identity. 
 
Rahmon has highlighted the importance of water to reinforce regional cooperation. 
The Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project, CASA-1000- 
would be a case in point: last May 2016 he stated that “Construction of South-North, 
Lolazor-Khatlon and Tajikistan-Afghanistan electricity transmission lines with the 
length of more than 670 km are among the completed projects”26. Started in 2006, it 
has meant a $1,800 million U.S. dollars investment on the part of Tajikistan. It 
involves major regional and world financial institutions and country cooperation. 
According to Rahmon, “Tajikistan has huge hydropower capacity and [it is] possible 
to generate 527 billion kw/hours of electricity […].not only for our benefit, but also for 
the benefit of the wider Central and South Asia.”27   
 
Casa-1000 Project seems to fit in legitimacy endeavours or, as it has been termed 
performative actions. In other words, these grandiose public works are in themselves 
“pillars of legitimisation.” (Maetveeva, 2009, 1119). Féaux de la Croix and 
Suyarkulova point out that “many large dams becomes synonymous with nation-																																																																																																																																																																													
its labour force. About 70% of the population suffers from electricity shortages in winter. (World Bank, 
2015).  
24 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2562 
25 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2559 
26 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/11700 
27 Ibid 
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building and have sometimes served as icons for the life of entire generations.” 
(2015, 109). Whenever its completion is achieved, Rogun will symbolize "a 
fundamental leap forward in national development, an existential achievement for the 
survival of the country” (Menga, 2015, 490). For Rahmon, “Rogun [is] a life and death 
issue” (Dubnov, 2009), and going ahead with the project may have an impact on 
regional balance of power. From another angle it has been noted that “over these last 
ten years, one can see that state building has been a strong driving force and water 
was one of the main issues that was dealt in order to accumulate the state’s power” 
(Allouche, 2005, 187). 
 
From the mid 2000 onwards, Rahmon began to orient his national and foreign policy 
emphasizing water issues. As a Tajik symbol it began to appear in public positioning 
and in various political contexts. In 2006, at the Navruz speech, Rahmon claimed that 
the “gigantic hydraulic dam, Sangtuda and Rogun, secures the energy independence 
of our country and [allows] our beloved Tajikistan to foster its own place among the 
developed countries”28. Rogun, as a modern national symbol had to be gigantic, 
much in accordance with a certain megalomaniac trait of his, both in terms of height, 
of electricity production capacity (Central Eurasia Standard, 2013, 9)29. It will mean 
the end of power shortages.  
 
Rogun is presented by the regime as an example of  ‘mass participation’ and a 
‘patriotic act’, although behind a so-called ‘voluntary’ act, coercive methods have 
been used and abused: portions of salaries, pensions, students stipends have been 
withheld and invested in the Rogun dam capital (Menga, 2015, 486) (Suyarkulova, 
2014, 375). In December 2009, Avesta,tj announced that ‘‘Dushanbe-dwellers will 
celebrate the Day of Unity in Construction of Rogun on January 6 [2010]” 
(Suyarkulova, 2014, 376), when the state began (coercively) selling Rogun shares, 
labelled People’s Initial Public Offering, IPO. Rahmon has claimed that: “this sacrifice 
for Rogun and the acquisition of the share is an exceptional voluntarily act- we do not 
force anyone to do it […] you do not build me, you build Tajik statehood!” (Dubnov, 																																																								
28 See http://www.president.tj/ru/node/1474 
29 Rogun dam will be 335 meters tall, the highest dam in the world. It will generate 3600 megawatts, 
twice of the country’s current capacity (Kucera, 2013). Official figures set annual electricity generation 
at 16.5 billion kWh (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). 
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2009). A few months later he called upon Tajiks to “tighten our belts and overcome 
the hardship. I wish us perseverance in this difficult but sacred undertaking.” 
(Avesta.tj, 2010)30.   
 
Since 2010 the value of shares sold amounted to 830 million somoni (188,5 million 
dollars), meaning that two million Tajiks are Rogun’s shareholders31. Despite the 
‘voluntary’ shares purchase, Féaux de la Croix and Suyarkulova describe the 
obstacles they faced when talking to the Tajiks on the Rogun dam project: 
“Government agencies were very concerned with controlling the region, including 
access by foreign research teams [wishing] to speak with locals” (2015, 108). Menga 
sees Rogun as a state ideology in which “rhetorical legitimation strategies” build up 
national patriotic consciousness (2015, 480).  
 
Seen as a tool of economic development and as a nationhood symbol, the dam may 
be also understood as a vehicle to instil nationalism amongst Tajiks, at least to the 
extent that the message may end-up permeating Tajiks’ imaginary. Yet two 
preconditions would have to be met: that the dam becomes an identity magnet, and 
that Tajiks themselves act and feel part of it. In any event, from Tajikistan’s official 
perspective, Rogun is more than a dam, it is the visibility of the immaterial 
understanding of the nation.  
 
In addition to enhancing patriotic sentiments, Rogun cements Rahmon’s power-
building and political presence. This theme has been emphasized prior to the 2010 
parliamentary elections. Avesta.tj is particularly laudatory, affirming that Tajiks show, 
“genuine enthusiasm” and a “profound patriotic exaltation” on the dam (Sattori, 
2010). For Suyarkulova (2014), Menga (2015), and Cariou (2015) it is an emblem in 
the making and, as a top-down initiative, those at the receiving end left with no other 
option than supporting it. It could very well be that, contrary to official discourse, 
Rogun might be a symbol of coercion. 
In his obsessive reference to the dam and its ever presence in Tajiks daily lives, 
Rahmon (2010) points out that “Rogun is not only a mere source of light but it is a 																																																								
30 In (Suyarkulova, 2014, 375) 
31 See http://tajikta.tj/news/detail.php?ID=455415 
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source of dignity and national honour.” (Cariou 2015, 40). His insistence on the 
virtues and potential of the dam seeks to generate consent, as everything seems to 
be anchored on the dam. Rogun, insists official rhetoric, is the solution and there is 
no other alternative to country’s socioeconomic development, and that regardless of 
the recent discovery of natural gas and oil resources in the western part of the 
country that, it is claimed, equals twice those of Norway’s proven reserves (Central 
Eurasia Standard, 2013, 13). It must be added that the incumbent prioritizes form 
rather than content. The laudatory dimension gets out of proportion: on April 4th 2010, 
Khovar,tj announced that it would publish “samples of poems and prose of nearly a 
hundred representatives of the Tajik intelligentsia”, underlining Rogun’s virtues32. In 
that line, gigantic posters representing the dam construction with Rahmon standing 
next to it, the media press releases and the personal implication of the president 
have inundated public spaces.  
 
Rahmon has used Rogun as an international visibility platform: soon after this 
national project was launched, Tajikistan became the ‘water country’ and the 
‘environmentally friendly’. Unsurprisingly, in 2013, Tajikistan organized the 
International Year of Water cooperation, putting forward also agreements as “the 
water-project leading country” (Menga, 2015, 489). Water allowed Tajikistan to be 
seen from a much different perspective than that of a semi-failed state, struggling to 
come out of the civil war aftermath and as a famine struck country. Again on water 
cooperation matters, in February 2014, Sulton Rahimov, the First Deputy Minister of 
Energy and Water Resources recalled that “the country actively promotes water 
issues on the global agenda and is the initiator of almost all “water” resolutions of UN 
General Assembly in the past decade.”33  
Initially a Soviet initiative34, it was revived in the middle of 2010s, presented by 
Rahmon as a “joyful and memorable event” (2006)35 . Financial difficulties and 
technical objections have stalled progress. Yet, in 2014, the World Bank released a 																																																								
32 See http://khovar.tj/rus/2010/04/obraztsy-poezii-i-prozy-o-rogune/ 
33 See http://eptoday.com/tajikistan-turn-water-cooperation/ 
34 Rogun plans were elaborated between 1965-1972 and the construction started in 1982 and halted 
in 1991. In 2004, Rahmon re-launched its construction, undertaken by Russia’s aluminium company 
RusAl. Works Disagreements led to the dam project stopped in 2007 due to disagreements. 
35  See http://www.prezident.tj/ru/node/6118 
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positive report, approving its construction (Féaux de la Croix and Suyarkulova, 2015, 
116). Rahmon claims that Rogun meets international technical norms and that its 
“construction follows the original plans”. He maintains further that it has been 
approved by the “World Bank, foreign independent experts, foreign companies 
specialised in this area” (Rahmon, 2015)36. Paradoxically, when nature seems to 
point out potential fault lines, for instance the 7,2 seism that on December the 7th 
2015 hit Tajikistan, and which caused some casualties. The project, wrote Khabibov, 
was “in the hands of Allah!” He added that “most of the experts […] speak with one 
voice that Rogun construction will continue” (Khabibov, 2015).  
  
At a bilateral level, Rahmon has accused Uzbekistan of hindering Tajikistan’s 
development policies. Clearly, the dam brings head to head two equally determined 
and authoritarian leaders Rahmon and Karimov.  Rahmon’s and Karimov’s animosity 
is a well-known fact as reported by Vremya.ru (2009)37. With undoubted clarity he 
affirmed that “Tashkent’s willingness to isolate Tajikistan from the outside world didn’t 
begin yesterday” (2010)38. Avesta.tj (2010), put it bluntly: Uzbekistan should “bury its 
ambitions”39 to put obstacles to the project. In essence the meaning behind the 
Rogun ideology is that Tajikistan masters its water resources. A country which 
controls its resources is a country that has the capacity to master its territory. In turn 
this legitimizes the state. The tense relations with Uzbekistan over water resources 
crystallized on the Rogun dam and highlighted the importance of the national 
territory, thus sovereignty and independence. Be that as it may, the dam has become 
a legitimizing factor. It has allowed the leader to strengthen (forced) consensus and 
cement internal power, and attain greater external assertiveness (Daly, 2015).  
Rahmon has made so many claims as to what the dam will accomplish (materially 
and immaterially) that he risks being caught by the weight of his own words. Yet, it 
appears that he cannot retreat: halting its construction would portray Rahmon as a 
weak leader, and that would run contrary to his aim of making Rogun his modern 
national identity narrative, his chef d’oeuvre, and legacy to the country. Whether and 																																																								
36See http://khovar.tj/rus/2015/07/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-tadzhikistan-emomali-rahmona-na-
vstreche-s-rukovodstvom-i-spetsialistami-rogunskoj-ges/ 
37 See http://www.vremya.ru/2009/228/5/243519.html). 
38 See http://avesta.tj/index.php?newsid=3811 
39 Ibid 
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when it will finally be completed, remains to be seen. This year an Italian company, 
Salini Impregilo, was chosen to continue the project. Yet its financing is still uncertain 
(Eurasianet.org, 2016). Thus, in the end, Rogun as a modern narrative rests much 
upon objective, material considerations beyond and besides the Leader’s rhetoric. 
 
c) The place of Islam under Rahmon’s regime   
 
The Soviet Union implosion brought to the forefront questions as to what would be 
the role and place of Islam in the region, how would it evolve and accommodate to 
the new political reality, and how the new leaderships would approach and control 
potentially disruptive religious activism.  
 
From its arrival in Central Asia in the 7th century AD (Kalanov and Alonso, 2008, 
175), Islam made its presence felt and still continues to perform a key role in society. 
A well-integrated faith, it was not a disruptive actor under the Soviet Union. At first an 
iron-hand strategy was applied resulting in “mass elimination and emigration of 
institutional clergy in the early years of the Soviet regime” (Olimova, 2011, 3) which 
afterwards adopted a rather flexible approach. From the 1940s, “the USSR regulated 
a state-sanctioned version of Islam through the Spiritual Administration of the 
Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan”, the SADUM (Epkenhans, 2015, 334). The 
SADUM, present in the five republics, defined and regulated Islamic practice in a 
bureaucratic manner, and with greater autonomy under Perestroika. Heathershaw 
and Montgomery affirm that this was due to a process of co-optation which led to a 
highly efficient modus operandi (2014, 1). Indeed, it was a sort of laisser-faire within 
an institutional functional framework that allowed for a subtle and well-controlled 
Islam in a secular society.  
 
The Soviet Union fall fed apprehension on the risk of Islamic fundamentalism, 
particularly in Central Asia. If Soviet collapse had meant political independence, for 
Islam, as practiced throughout the region, it signified the removal of any major 
constraints to interact, diversify and create linkages with Islamic forces throughout 
and beyond Central Asia. From that reading, the conditions existed for the region to 
enter into a turbulent religious phase. Security approaches have proliferated ever-
since, often not well-supported and frequently biased, or hardly objective, as 
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Heathershaw and Montgomery (2014) have pointed out.  
 
Independence had been preceded by intense debate on regional, economic and 
religious matters, national identity and, of course, the role of Islam. Rahmon himself 
has pointed out that “it is worth noting that the late 80s of the XX century saw the 
emergence of political forces that initiated the debates on nation-building” (2012)40. 
Yet, he very soon accuses them of leading a struggle for power more than by nation 
building concerns, affirming bluntly that what those activists aimed at was to 
“transform the secular state into Islamic rule”, and that it was this underlying goal 
which led to “internal confrontation” (ibid). 
 
For Rahmon the civil war meant that if he were to prevail he had to restrain, 
manipulate and control Islamic and other potentially disruptive forces. He knew of the 
necessity to craft a solid and ever-wider power base. In this enterprise nation building 
and national identity construction became fundamental, and also to determine the 
role that Islam should play. This was particularly important given the role of the IRPT 
in Islamic matters and in the armed struggle. Islam therefore emerged for the regime 
as a clear political target. Throughout his speeches, when making veiled references 
to the IRPT and unnamed foreign actors, Rahmon alludes to Islamic disruptive 
forces41, something rather far from reality because Sunni Hanafism is highly centred 
on the community and seldom interested on matters beyond the national level. 
 
Therefore, in the logic of Tajik civil war, ascribing to the IRPT a destabilising agenda 
is not objectively justified. It has been maintained that its cadres identified 
themselves with an inward-looking Islam, and whatever extremist positions were very 
soon abandoned. Nourzhanov points out that the Party’s platform hardly shows any 
radical positioning (2014, 77). The IRPT “shifted their agenda from demanding the 
abolition of the secular state and the introduction of Islamic radicalism to a more 
pragmatic, tolerant stance” (Olimova, 2011, 4). Yet, Rahmon was very distrustful of 
the IRPT and quickly moved to reform the bureaucratic structures that regulated Islamic 
practices (Nourzhanov and Bleuer, 2013, 335-336). He also gradually and swiftly began to 																																																								
40 Rahmon in his 15th Anniversary of the General Speech on the occasion of the 15th Anniversary of 
the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (26/06/12). 
41 In his 2011 Independence speech : http://www.president.tj/en/node/2559 
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portrait the IRPT as being the cause and at the root of civil strife. In the same logic, 
he started to pay lip-service to Islam and its main historical figures: “unfortunately, 
some extremist and fundamentalist groups have […] tried to separate national & 
Islamic values […] It is worth remembering that 97% of Tajikistan`s population are 
followers of Imam Abu Hanifa. We are very proud that the founder of the most 
influential current in Islam is a noble son of the Tajik nation” (Rahmon, 2008).  
 
Fears of fundamentalist Islamic upheaval played into Rahmon’s hands: neighbouring 
countries in particular and the West in general would be if not overtly complacent at 
least understanding if iron-hand were used to contain political opposition and dissent. 
On the basis of fieldwork, Heathershaw and Montgomery harshly discard as myths 
claims of post-Soviet Muslim radicalisation. Those myths “may provide the basis for 
common threat perceptions, collaboration in counter-radicalization initiatives and 
international security assistance in the region” (2014, 1). According to them “the few 
radical groups that exist and violent events that occur are better understood on a 
case-by case basis and not as part of a supposed general trend of radicalization” 
(2014, 3). 
 
In what it relates to the bureaucratic structures regulating Islam’s practices, Rahmon 
began a gradual yet in-depth reorganization to bring them under his control. Rahmon 
began to refer to Islam as one among other important factors in national identity 
building and to curtail its visibility. In fact, “the political nomenklatura [considered that] 
depicting any form of public religiosity outside the official institutions [was] a 
manifestation of extremism or fundamentalism instigated from abroad” (Epkenhans, 
2015, 329).  He also started to restructure religious official institutions, replace their 
top officials, and give them a new political orientation. The aim was to reduce the 
autonomy they had acquired during perestroika. The subordination of those 
structures has been the work of Saidmiukarram Abdulgodirzoda, appointed by 
Rahmon and in charge of both, the Islamic Centre and the Council of Tajikistan’s 
ulamo, He has reformed the academic curriculum of the Islamic University, the 
Islamic secondary schools, promoted quietist traditional Islamic approaches and 
regime-loyalty. At a clearly political level, since 2012 the Islamic Centre has imposed 
Friay’s prayer topic. For the March 2015 parliamentary elections it suggested for 
whom vote (Epkenhans, 2015, 329). The intention is to occupy all spaces, orient 
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reflection and control Islamic clergy structures. This manipulation does not impede 
Rahmon from proclaiming his attachment to democracy. In his 2012 speech on 
National Unity Day, he asserted that “it is of critical importance for this generation to 
deeply realize the vital role of […] national unity in building a democratic and fair 
society”42.   
 
Related to that, and to generational changes, Laruelle argues that the new 
generations will have a constructive impact upon Islam and democracy and, 
therefore, on the place this religion occupies in secular societies. The influence and 
role of young generations will also have an effect on how the ruling elites tackle 
religious matters. Governments will have to be attentive to the young generations’ 
concerns on religion. Laruelle further argues that this will give an impulse to 
democracy (2015, 5). In what it concerns Tajikistan she asserts that “despite its 
weakening at the hand of President Emomali Rakhmon’s, […] the IRPT constitutes a 
major element of Tajik political life and that it has obliged the authorities to be more 
liberal than their Uzbek, Turkmen, or even Kazakh counterparts” (2015, 2). Yet, 
Laruelle makes abstraction of the regimes contradictory positioning: Rahmon 
declares his attachment to democracy and, at the same time, through the Islamic 
Centre and the Department of Religious Affairs, controls the administrative, political 
and ideological orientations of the Islamic clergy. Placing too much emphasis on 
generational changes and less on the autocratic nature of the regime led her to make 
unsubstantiated claims: not only was the IRPT prevented from participating in the 
2015 elections, in September of that year the Tajik courts banned the IRPT, ruling 
the party was a terrorist organization (McGlinchey, 2015, 5) (Khamidova, 2016). 
 
Throughout time it has become evident that, as he has strengthened his grip on 
power, Rahmon does not admit any challenge to his authority. Apparently, in his view 
Islam should be a tool that enhances social cohesiveness. Therefore, any “Muslim 
who challenges the government is depicted as a ‘radical’ [and] a threat to society. In 
defining radicalism in this way […] all opposition [can be considered] extremist and 
potentially violent.” (Heathershaw and Montgomery, 2014, 7). Rahmon’s regime has 
introduced various control measures: men have to shave their beard, imams are 																																																								
42 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2199 
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given new uniforms, women must not wear hijabs or any other Islamic traditional 
outfits (Najibullah and Recknagel, 2015) (Putz, 2015). 
After a quarter of a century, the place of Islam in Tajikistan’s secular society has 
shifted from being practiced with relative ease and in a highly autonomous and 
harmonious manner, to an increasingly subordinated role to specific governmental 
structures. At the same time, much in line with his proclivity to manipulate the main 
constituent pillars in his nation building narratives, Rahmon has deployed every effort 
to project Islam as a religion that has adapted itself to the traits and features of the 
nation. He has gone as far as saying that “Islam has [intermingled] with our ancient 
culture and now it is an integral part of our culture” (Rahmon, 2009).  
 
Throughout his long stay in office, he is keenly aware of the necessity (and of the 
potential advantage) to pay tribute to Islam and, at the same time, engaging in 
political recuperation of key historical Islamic figures: 2009 was the 1310 
commemorative anniversary of Imam Abu Hanifa. He used the occasion to 
underscore that the Imam was a state builder who insisted on obedience to 
established authority. In his keynote speech at The International Symposium on 
Imam A’zam and the modern world (2009), he underscored Abu Hanifa’s teachings 
more as they relate to universal values than to Hanifa’s view of Islam. The 
Symposium’s intention was “to draw the attention of the world community to [Abu 
Hanifa’s] valuable doctrine including first of all the peace-loving aspects of his 
teachings, given today’s volatile situation, because these values strengthen unity 
[and] mutual understanding”43. 
 
Along those lines, any occasion seems to be good enough to insist that the place of 
Islam is central, but that it is not the centre, and that Tajikistan’s history shows how 
main world religions have coexisted in tolerance and without any hindrance. Thus on 
the occasion of Tajikistan 16th independence anniversary, coinciding with the 800 
anniversary of the poet Mowlana Jaloloddini Balkhi, Rahmon, reminded that during 
the poet’s lifetime “Islam played a key role in society, and there was no restriction for 
other religions, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Judaism” (2007) 44 . He added that 																																																								
43 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2522 
44 See 2007 Independence speech http://www.president.tj/en/node/2563 
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humankind is the creation of God, implicitly saying that no religion is above other 
religions, Islam included.  
In essence, Rahmon’s view is that Islam should unite and must not be above the 
state. Additionally, the manner in which it is practiced as well as the structures that 
norm those who conduct it and orient its practice have to be controlled. He has 
clearly warned against “the constant growing trend of politicization of Islam [because 
it] is detrimental to the religion.” (2015)45. He boasts that the regime had published 50 
thousand issues of the Koran.  
 
In his nation building narratives, Rahmon has de-emphasized Islam’s importance, 
has reformed and subordinated its bureaucratic structures and put them firmly under 
state’s control, and has appropriated Islamic figures such as Abu Hanifa, 
underscoring their public dimensions. He has purely and simply done away with 
political opposition, the IRPT, a political structure central to the reconciliation process 
and party to the General Peace Agreement signed in 1997. The IRPT, a political 
institution that had embarked in a wider debate that went beyond electoral politics 
and was centred on the place of Islam in a pluralistic society. In exile, the leader of 
the now banned IRPT, having referred to his party refusal to take the armed path, 
said: “I do not regret that we have chosen the path of tolerance and restrain” 
(Khamidova, 2016).  
 
The preceding narratives have sought to illustrate how Rahmon has tried to engrain 
his vision of a nation and to consolidate his grip on power. 
 
 
  
																																																								
45 See 2015 Speech to the Parliament http://president.tj/en/node/8141 
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Chapter 4:  Autocracy consolidated:  Rahmon, the making of a 
national symbol 
 
This chapter will illustrate how state’s structures have crafted and inscribed into law 
the symbol of the Leader as the incarnation of national unity. It shows expressions of 
support to such symbol-making process, as reported by state’s news agencies; 
finally, it will centre on some performative initiatives, or “Great Distractions” 46 , 
depicting Rahmon’s uncontested power.  
 
a) The role of state’s structures in the making of Rahmon as a national symbol 
 
Rahmon’s quest of total power results from two intertwined endeavours: nation 
building and national identity construction, on the one hand, and the articulation and 
gradual cementation of political power, on the other. In what it pertains power, his 
manoeuvring to call for a national referendum to reform the Constitution paved the 
way for Parliament to pass a law that has declared him The founder of peace and 
national unity-the Leader of the Nation47. This has been achieved in a sure and 
gradual manner.  
 
The president’s speeches shed light on his preoccupations, obsessions and political 
phobias. His insistence may lead the reader to doubt as to how efficient or how 
successful those policies have been. Such recurrent themes convey also the 
possibility that Rahmon himself is not fully convinced that his discourses and policies 
have been understood and integrated by the people. Additionally, it is worth noting 
that there is neither clear logic nor thematic organization in the official discourses, 
whose topics are of two types: public policies, and conceptual. On public policies, 
year after year Rahmon has emphasized great social achievements on governmental 
reforms, educational progress, energy, communication infrastructure, food security, 
water management, for instance, as well as on the role of the youth and women in 
the construction of a modern state, and on science and technology. Rahmon as 																																																								
46Expression taken from Pannier in The first 40 days: an Introduction http://www.rferl.mobi/a/the-first-
40-days-introduction-central-asia/27587345.html 
47 From now onwards I will refer to the Law of the Leader or the Law 
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someone attentive to anything concerning Tajikistan, he gives advices and warns on 
issues potentially harmful for the country. Globalization can be beneficial and 
harmful, and he suggests to be prudent: in one of his many speeches, Rahmon ask 
Tajiks “to promote the supreme values of our ancient people in the context of 
globalization. This process, along with its positive aspects [implies also] a clash of 
values and of cultures.” (2013)48. He warns on the threat of extremism and terrorism. 
In his speech to Parliament in February 2016, he declared that the fight against: 
“terrorism and extremism requires developing an environment of trust and respect of 
everybody’s interest, [as well].”49  
 
In what it pertains to conceptual references related to national identity, his speeches 
abound with themes such as: national unity, solidarity, independence and 
sovereignty, self-consciousness, modern nation, patriotism, national pride, united 
territory and territorial integrity. Their recurrence allows us to infer that for Rahmon 
the process of nation building is not yet achieved. He hammers on them as if by so 
doing he will succeed in instilling those values in the audience.  If we were to single 
out three of the most recurrent conceptual themes, “national unity”, “state 
independence” and “national sovereignty” would be on top. From the manner in 
which they are dealt with in speeches, official sites and news agencies, it is implied 
that these values and pillars of nationhood are constantly reinforced by the Leader. 
On its website Khovar.tj has a quote by Rahmon that clearly subsumes his thinking 
on the subject:  
 
National Unity is for us the most valuable and high achievement, a 
fundamental condition for the well-being of our people and the fundamental 
development and progress of our beloved Motherland. 
 
Nation building and national identity construction have gone hand in hand with 
Rahmon’s power building. Buisson maintains that there has been a “prioritization of a 
power-building strategy on state-building since the Kulobis took power” in reference 
to the region from which he comes from (Buisson, 2007, 115). Throughout that long 
process he has become the uncontested Leader, the incarnation of the values he 																																																								
48 2013 Parliament speech: http://president.tj/en/node/4325 
49 See http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/10608 
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ascribes to the nation and to the state. That portrait is reflected in the Law of the 
Leader. From another angle, Rahmon insists that his government’s policies are law-
abiding: on September 2015, he celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Constitutional 
Court, which proofs, in his view, that Tajikistan is “democratic and law-based 
country”50. He maintains that Tajikistan has solid and independent legal institutions 
and that they are the foundations “of a fair society [because] it is impossible to 
imagine [it] without independent judiciary [power]”51. In this regard, the institutional 
symbols help to “apply coercion in a targeted fashion and [are part of the] discursive 
narratives to shore up Rahmon’s support” (Markowitz, 2012, 99). Depending on 
specific contextual situations, Rahmon’s methods try to be persuasive and give 
proper advice for the wellbeing of society. So referring to the difficult international 
economic situation, and how it impacts upon Tajikistan, he affirms that every citizen 
“is obliged to perform […] in a creative way [in order to] enhance the economic 
potential of [the country]” (2016)52. Or he is blunt when he speaks of presumed 
threats to the integrity of the nation supposedly performed at the instigation of the 
IRPT, calling them “traitors” and warning that they will not be successful.  
 
That cementation of political (and, it is assumed, economic) power has been 
articulated by the interlinking of gradual and clear legislative building blocks that led 
to the enactment of the Law of the Leader. Two prior milestones are worth noting: 
last December 25th 2015, after the unanimous approval by the Majlisi Milli Majlisi Oli 
(Upper House) and then by the Majlisi Namayandagon Majlisi Oli (Lower House), 
Rahmon was officially declared The founder of peace and national unity and the 
Leader of the Nation. The legislative power had already approved and established 
the President Day.  Coincidentally, Rahmon’s day takes place each November 16, 
the day he officially took power (16/11/92) (ASIA-Plus, 2016). The culminating 
building block in the construction of the political pedestal is the Law of the Leader.      
 
The law was preceded by a legalistic due process: Parliament, sole “source of state 
power” according to article 6 of the Constitution (Kolomova, 2016), elevated Rahmon 
																																																								
50 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/9952 
51 Ibid 
52 2016 Speech to the Parliament: http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/10608 
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to the rank of Leader of the Nation. Reality is, of course, more prosaic: Parliament is, 
in essence, subservient to the president, whose People’s Democratic Party has total 
majority, the upper house has 33 seats, and the lower house 63, whose members 
were presumably nominated by Rahmon. Public figures from whatever field of activity 
would hardly defend independent positions53. Primary sources show that the Law of 
the Leader required amendments and reforms to the Constitution. Such changes, not 
specifically detailed and available abroad, were approved by Parliament on 22nd of 
February of this year 54 . To give greater credence to that legalistic process a 
referendum was organised in order to give people the opportunity to participate in 
such direct democratic exercise. According to Eurasia.net, the question put to the 
voters was plain: “Do you support changes to the constitution? Yes or no” 
(Eurasianet.org, 2016). The referendum took place on the 22nd of May 2016. Foreign 
newspapers highlight that its outcome increases Rahmon’s power by legally putting 
him as the ruler for life. It also paves the way for the Leader’s successor, much likely 
his son55. 
 
In the official discourses, the referendum reflects Tajik’s political position. A note 
published on the presidential website56, the day of the referendum, praises the “broad 
participation of the people” as it underlines the “high political culture” and the their 
support of peace, stability and socio-economic development of the country. The note 
portrays Rahmon as part of such an “important political event”. According to Avesta.tj 
(2016) the participation turnout was nearly 4.4 million voters, out of nearly 4.5 million 
registered ones. In other words, 92% of the total registered voters participated in the 
referendum, and 94.7% voted in favour.  
 
The referendum may be seen as evidence of Rahmon’s grip on state power, a 
process that had accelerated since the end of the civil war. In turn, the law making of 
him the symbol of national unity draws a portrait on the borderlines of a sanctified 																																																								
53 Figures in http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2903 
54  See http://ru.parlament.tj/news/izmeneniya-i-dopolneniya-v-konstituciyu-respubliki-tadzhikistan/ 
55See http://www.rferl.mobi/a/qishloq-ovozi-first-40-days-tajikistan/27583092.html, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/tajikistan-parliament-approves-constitutional-changes-
presidential-term-emomali-rahmon,  
56 see http://www.president.tj/en/node/11815 
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ruler. Additionally, it renders clear the subordinated character of Parliament, as 
illustrated in one of its statements:  
 
[The] draft of this law is developed taking into account the valuable contribution of His 
Excellency, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Leader of the Nation Mr. 
Emomali Rahmon in the formation of modern statehood of the country, revival of the 
national government, promotion of peace, unity and enhancement of the authority of 
Tajikistan in international arena (Parliament.tj, 2016). 
 
Parliament has further added that the amendments to the Constitution were 
necessary for the people to acknowledge the merits and qualities of the one who 
“made a great service to [the] nation and [the] country. He does not need this but 
people [benefits from his] achievements” (2016)57.  
 
The Law, thus far available only in Russian and Tajik versions, is made up sixteen 
articles58 . Article 1 reflects Parliament’s statement quoted above. It designates 
Rahmon as the “symbol of the longevity of the Tajik sovereign state, of peace, of 
national unity” and the “guarantor of a stable development”. Article 3, states that the 
Leader of the Nation can participate, make recommendations and assist Parliament 
on “any important state and social issues, on internal and external affairs”. He is also 
granted a seat for life in Parliament and will be the “Representative of the public 
movement and national unity of Tajikistan”. Article 4 stipulates that prizes and official 
decorations will be established in his honour. There will be the “Leader of the Nation” 
state prize and decoration, approved beforehand by Rahmon himself. From now on, 
he will enjoy public prosecution immunity for life. According to Articles 5, 6, and 10, 
he, as well as his family, is entitled to social and health insurances, official housing 
accommodations and transportation and, according to Article 7, to all state services, 
security protection, as established by Article 8. Article 13 stipulates that he will 
benefit from a state pension equivalent to 80 per cent of his current salary. On 
cultural matters, article 11 states that “museums, a library and archives of the 
Founder of Peace and National Unity- the Leader of the Nation will be erected”, 
financed by the State budget (Article 14). 																																																								
57 See http://en.parlament.tj/news/adoption-of-law-on-the-founder-of-peace-and-national-unity-leader-
of-the-nation/ 
58 See http://www.prezident.tj/ru/taxonomy/term/5/951 
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The Law further engraves the name of Rahmon in Tajikistan’s history. According to 
the spirit of the Law, he embodies national independence, national unity. Its 
implications are many and of a different nature: in real terms, it signifies the 
affirmation of Rahmon as the autocratic leader. It demonstrates his uncontested grip 
on power. It suggests the further weakening of any semblance of substantive 
democratic political order, the subservience of the state’s structures, and the 
subordination of societal forces of whatever orientation.  
 
b) Referendum on amendments to the Constitution, and the Law of the Leader  
  
In addition to Parliament’s view of the pertinence of the Law, other institutions and 
public personalities have joined in support of the referendum, the Law of the Leader 
and of Rahmon. Judging from available sources, Tajik media does not convey views 
of a large social spectrum. Not hint whatsoever at what the people feel or think. The 
people are just represented. It has its spokespersons and, implicitly, it is assumed 
that they know best. The autocratic nature of the country is masked by an imagined 
narrative/vision of nation building: Tajikistan is a free and democratic country where 
the people are sovereign. It is therefore no accident that Shukurdzhon Zuhurov, 
Chairman of the Lower House of Parliament, asserts that the “referendum is folded in 
the flag of democracy and freedom such as in other countries.” (2016). He adds that 
the recognition of Rahmon as the Leader of the Nation is not contrary to Tajiks’ 
attachment to democratic values59.  
 
Jamshed Nurmahamadzoda, Chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan (TNB), and 
until last May former Finance deputy minister, backed the yes vote in the national 
referendum. He asked TNB cadres and employees to cast a “logic” vote. According 
to Khovar.tj, Nurmahamadzodo stresses that the “amendments […] to the 
Constitution […] aimed at a sustainable and stable development of society, further 
[…] democratization of public life, strengthening and improvement of the 
constitutional bases of state power and the development of the state language.” 
																																																								
59 See http://en.parlament.tj/news/adoption-of-law-on-the-founder-of-peace-and-national-unity-leader-
of-the-nation/ 
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(2016) 60 . The referendum is thus presented as leading towards greater 
democratization and consolidation of Tajikistan’s sovereignty.  
 
Such laudatory and hardly objective portrayals of the president are not circumscribed 
to high state’s representatives: in December 2015 Rafika Musoeva, the Chairman of 
the Association of power engineers of Tajikistan, like other influential personalities, 
supports the constitutional amendments. In her view Rahmon is “the one who is able 
to take full responsibility for the fate of his people” and he “has proven himself as a 
real Leader […] with strongly marked will, strong principles, selflessly devoted to his 
chosen cause”61. Rahmon, she reminds, put an end to the civil war and made 
Tajikistan independent and sovereign, and with due regard for democratic principles 
has fostered sustainable economic development. Independence “was the dream of 
[our] ancestors”. Rahmon was capable of transforming this “dream into reality”. As 
Rahmon is the protector of Tajik lives, from Musoeva’s point of view, his new status 
is not “divorced from reality” as it is merely elevated and enshrined in law. It 
formalizes a status that has been “already approved in the world”.  
 
In the publicity campaign in favour of the referendum and, therefore, of the yes vote, 
prominence was given also to people from academic circles. On May 3rd 2016, 
Khovar.tj published an article by professor Makhbuba Kamolova who maintained that 
the referendum marked the “development of democratic institutions”62. It symbolizes 
“direct democracy” and concerns “the main issues related to the State and society”. 
Kamolova points out that the referendum is of “great importance for the modern Tajik 
Constitutionalism”. To give it greater credence he adds that it has been used by 
many “western democracies” and that it permits the direct “inclusion of mass 
population in the state management process”. It is obvious that she fails to mention 
that a referendum is not proof of greater democracy nor is it a democratic tool in 
itself, unless, as Dr. Maria Koinova, points out, “the rules of engagement are 																																																								
60See http://khovar.tj/eng/2016/02/nbt-calls-the-employees-for-active-participation-in-national-
referendum/]. 
61See http://khovar.tj/eng/2015/12/glava-sogda-2016-god-v-oblasti-obyavlen-godom-zdorovogo-
cheloveka/ 
62See http://khovar.tj/rus/2016/05/referendum-kak-institut-pryamogo-narodovlastiya-v-sisteme-
tadzhikskoj-gosudarstvennosti/] 
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negotiated between the stakeholders in advance” (2014)63. The approval of the 
constitutional amendments by Parliament in February 2016 and the referendum and 
the public support by representatives of public institutions and public personalities do 
not meet the criteria or the conditioned mentioned by Dr. Koinova. As it was 
foreseen, the changes were approved and the Law enacted, by the formal 
involvement of Tajik people and the unquestionable support of the state’s structures 
and its representatives, and the equally laudatory participation of public personalities. 
 
At a different level, the speeches by the president, high officials and personalities 
suggest a sort of connecting bridge between what Rahmon thinks of the people and 
how those public figures view the Leader: Rahmon always refer to the Tajiks as 
noble and generous and, in turn, he is portrayed as devoted to the nation. In brief, 
the Leader and the people are in perpetual communion. He has done everything 
within his power and capabilities to improve Tajiks welfare, and the nation 
compensates such commitment by enshrining his patriotic virtues in the Law. This 
devotion to the Leader is very much projected in mass media, itself a reflection of the 
control that the government exercises upon it. Rahmon manages a double and 
contradictory discourse on the role of media, pluralism and freedom of the press. A 
subordinated mass media is in itself a clear sign of the Leader’s regime and of his 
until now efficacious power building. 
 
Not surprisingly, Tajik media underlines also Rahmon’s presumed greatness. In 
Khovar.tj cultural section, most of the articles have to do with national identity 
matters. Avesta.tj, centres its coverage on Rahmon’s master piece, the Rogun dam. 
As Tajikistan is markedly autocratic, mass media is increasingly controlled, 
essentially therefore conveying official views. Contradictions are abundant: in 2006 
Rahmon praises in front of the Parliament the “free activity of 8 political parties, 2700 
NGOs, 262 newspapers, 81 magazines, 22 non-state TV and radio stations, and 9 
news agencies is a clear sign of citizens’ rights and interests, different political 
approach.” 64 . Around this time, Laruelle and Peyrouse affirm that “the main 
																																																								
63 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/06/08/referendums-a-legitimate-democratic-tool-or-a-
mechanism-for-nationalist-co-optation/ 
64 See  http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/10611 
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independent newspapers Ruzi Nav, Nerui Sukhan, were accused of defamation of 
the president and governmental representatives. [Rahmon] sees political debate as a 
challenge to his authority. Complot theories and fifth column put in danger state’s 
security, are arguments often used [by the government]” (2005, 39). Six year later, on 
the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Tajik press, Rahmon claimed that the 
“freedom of media is one of the most important achievements of independent 
Tajikistan’’ (2012)65. According to him, the excess of laudatory comments was one of 
the factors of the Soviet Union collapse. His presumed attachment to freedom of the 
press refers to a non-existent reality: In 2013 Reporters without Borders ranked 
Tajikistan 123 out of 177 in observance of freedom of the press. The worst year for 
media freedom is 2016: the country ranks 150 out of 18066. Rahmon’s vision of the 
media changed rapidly too: he asserts that some people could use it to destabilize 
the country and “cast doubt on [Tajiks] national customs and traditions” (2013)67.  
 
In any event, Rahmon seems to care little about the contradictions that his 
statements reflect. The primary sources cited show that, at one moment he professes 
his respect for freedom of opinion, and the next he warns that too much freedom may 
weaken tradition and values. In his speech to Parliament in 2013, Rahmon said that 
there was “an expansion of […] political pluralism”, and that it should be exercised 
“within the boundaries of [the law, for if not it could] undermine the stability of the 
country ”. Such advice is constantly given: the threat of “antipatriotic groups, 
domestic extremists and some interested foreign circles” appears and reappears in 
the president speeches (Rahmon, 2011). As recently as January 2016, in his annual 
address to Parliament, Rahmon declared that “the traitors of the Tajik nation and 
their foreign commanders have forgotten that the honourable people of independent 
Tajikistan will not allow anyone to overthrow their secure and peaceful life anymore 
with the help of provocation and intrigues like in the 1990s”.  Aside for the inference 
to civil war, it is not at all clear whom does he refer to when he speaks of the rebels’ 
“foreign masters”68. 																																																								
65See http://news.tj/en/news/rahmon-freedom-media-one-most-important-achievements-independent-
tajikistan 
66 See https://rsf.org/fr/tadjikistan 
67 See http://president.tj/en/node/4325 
68 See http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/10608 
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c) ‘Great Distractions’, performative legitimacy exercises  
 
Rahmon’s government has striven to enhance and enrich Tajikistan’s national 
identity symbols. In this logic, traditional markers, national festivities, ancient and 
newly created ones, are used by the regime to remind Tajiks of their patriotic duties 
and to instil loyalty towards the Leader. His government has added celebrations to 
the civic calendar. They concern heroic figures, cultural personalities, traditional 
habits, dress, horticulture, and the like. The calendar celebration, or rather the year 
of… is, to say the least, colourful and plentiful. As mentioned before, Pannier calls 
these performative initiatives the “great distraction” (2016), instrumental to engrain 
patriotism and pride in the cultural Tajik heritage. It has a political function, and 
seems to be a modern version of the ancient Roman practice known as bread and 
circuses. Those activities deviate precious economic resources and distract people 
from political reflection. Attention is requested on the recurrent Rahmonian much 
cherished topics. In 2008 he justified those celebrations in the following manner:  
 
“without any exaggeration, these great national and state celebrations will assist in 
developing and strengthening the process of self-consciousness, self-determination, 
national unity, strong feelings of patriotism by each citizen of beloved Tajikistan. It will 
strengthen the love to the ancient country and preserve the poetic language of 
Rudaki, and the bounds between the past and today are a marker that guide us to 
the way of new achievements and progress”. 69  
 
A sample of those the year of, celebrations can be categorized as follows: 
 
National figures and values 
v 2008 was the “year of the Tajik language”, along with the “1150th anniversary 
of the King of poets- Rudaki”70. Rudaki represents the beauty, the originality 
and immortality of the Tajik language. Language became a main constituent 
and unifying element in nation building. Tajik language is the “symbol of 
nationhood, national identity and guarantor of the existence of the world-
famous culture and the pride of all Tajik people.” (Rahmon, 2013)71.  																																																								
69  2008 Independence speech: http://www.president.tj/en/node/2562 
70 Ibid 
71 See http://president.tj/en/node/8141 
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v 2009 marked the “Jubilee year of the Great Imam Abu Hanifa”, the founder of 
Hanafism, an Islamic school of thought, and above all, a pillar of statehood, In 
2015 Abu Hanifa’s 1310th anniversary was again celebrated72.  
v 2003-2015, water entered the civic calendar: with the “International Year of 
Fresh Water” in 2003; then from 2005 it was the turn of the “International 
Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’”; and in 2013, the “International Year of 
Water Cooperation”. They all have become national celebrations.  
v 2015, was the turn of the “Year of the Family”73.  
v 2015 the regime celebrated the 700 anniversary of the Philosopher Mir Said 
Ali Hamadani. He “played an important role in the expansion of the national 
sense of responsibility, self-identification and self-consciousness […]” 
(Rahmon, 2016)74. 
 
The regime has undertaken other initiatives aimed at engraining national identity 
consciousness and, in passing, distancing the country from markers linked to the 
Soviet period. They also strive to contain Islam’s religious and cultural influence. 
Again, language comes in handy: 
 
v From 2016, a sort of back to the source linguistic initiatives has been 
introduced. These policies centre on renaming geographical places (cities and 
districts) which at present bear Soviet-Russian, Arab and Turkic names. They 
will be given others with Persian or Tajik connotations (Najbullah, 2016). 
v Also from 2016, those ‘back to the source initiatives’, apply to people: Arabic-
like names will be forbidden, instead ‘original’ Tajik-Persian names should be 
given to new-borns, to prevent further divisions in Tajik society, according to 
the Justice Minister The state Committee for Language and Terminology has 
published a list of 4000 ‘true’ Tajik names75. In 2007, Rahmon himself dropped 
the Russian suffix ov.  
  																																																								
72 See 2008 and 2015 Independence speeches 
73 See the 2015 speech to Parliament 
74 See http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/10608 
75See http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-ban-arabic-names-marriage-between-
cousins/27486012.html] 
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In a more prosaic line, Rahmon’s regime has established other commemorations, 
such as: 
  
v The “day of wrestlers”, followed by “the day of horse riders” and the “day of 
flowers and planting.” (BBC, 2016) and part and parcel of that joyful approach 
to Tajikness, there is the annual holiday of Honey and Melon. These products 
are proudly part of the Tajik folklore (ASIA-Plus, 2015). The melon is even 
symbolized in the newly 43 meters high National Tea House, whose 
architecture recreates the shape of the fruit. 
v A different type of great distractors concern Rahmon’s megalomaniac and 
construction of ever taller, grandiose and expensive public sites: the flagpole 
(2011); the national library (2012); the National Museum (2013); the National 
Theatre (2013); the National teahouse (2014)  (Eurasianet.org, 2015)76.  
 
These ‘great distractions’ are codified by the state institutions and may be seen as 
part of the ideological platform that Rahmon has articulated throughout his long stay 
in power. According to Salimov, in this endeavour the Academy of Sciences has 
been fundamental. It has been central in the regime’s efforts to “counterbalance 
propaganda hostile to Tajikistan” (2015). Presumably, the Academy has presented a 
“more accurate and objective information [for instance on the civil war] compared to 
other sources” (Salimov, 2015). Additionally, in his efforts to strengthen nation and 
national Rahmon emphasizes the role to be played by the young generations: 
 
On youth and education 
v In 2012 on the occasion of the National Unity day, he said that “it is of critical 
importance for this generation to deeply realize the vital role of national unity 
in building a democratic and fair society, as well as in strengthening the pillars 
of the independence of our beloved Motherland”77  
v In his speech on National Unity, in 2015 he declared that: “the wisdom of our 
ancestors must become your life credo […] In this regard, primary importance 
																																																								
76 See  http://www.president.tj/en/node/8466 and http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72976 
77 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2199 
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must be given to the propaganda of the essence of modern national state and 
statehood, respect for the supremacy of law, defence of the interests of 
Government and People of Tajikistan, values of the national unity, peace and 
political stability, defence of values and achievements of the State 
Independence, as well as prevention of involvement in any kind of radical 
groups and movements.”78  
v 2016 has been declared the Tajik youth Day, and in March-April took place the 
festival “Radiance of Youth”, (Khovar.tj)79. 
v Rahmon himself is becoming a cult object: in February 2016 “a contest for the 
best essays in praise of the “heroic” rule of Rahmon Emomali”, was organized 
by the governmental Youth affairs committee, the theme simply was: “Young 
People: Followers of the Leader of the Nation” (AFP, 2016). 
 
The regime is becoming increasingly autocratic, as illustrated by the great 
distractions mentioned above including the contest having Rahmon as the main 
topic. Higher education is being permeated also by this cult of personality tendency. 
For instance, the Director of the Law Faculty at the National University of Tajikistan 
(NUT), insists that “the ‘Children of the Nation’, the youth must respect and 
remember the ‘Father of the nation’ who saved the nation from imploding […] 
fortunately they did not suffer from the civil war, [and thus] need to know that the 
Leader of the nation Emomali Rahmon has ended this war.” (Fergananews.com, 
2016). The underlying message is that freedoms and pluralism impinge upon social 
harmony, and that peace and stability are guaranteed by a single party system and a 
strong leader (Roche, 2013, 69). A clear example of coerciveness, applied by 
educational institutions, is that from 2016 students at some faculties of the NUT have 
to enrol in a course on “Emomali Rahmon - the architect of the new Tajik state”. 
History students already take courses on Rahmon’s masterpiece “The Tajiks in the 
Mirror of History”. Fergananews.com details that the course consists of 32 hours of 
theory and 32 of practical work. The course covers the “Rahmon period” only. 
Rahmon stresses youth’s responsibility towards the nation. Again on the 2015 
National Unity speech, he reminded them that: 																																																								
78 See http://president.tj/en/node/9242 
79See http://khovar.tj/eng/2016/01/the-festival-contest-radiance-of-youth-will-be-held-in-sughd-region/ 
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The wisdom of our ancestors must become your life credo […] primary importance 
must be given to […] the essence of modern national state and statehood, respect for 
the supremacy of law, defence of interests of Government and People of Tajikistan, 
values of the national unity, peace and political stability, defence of values and 
achievements of the State Independence, as well as prevention of involvement in any 
kind of radical groups and movements.80  
 
In what it concerns the role of women in society, Rahmon uses also paternalistic 
figures of speech when he says that they symbolize the Motherland. Official 
celebrations have suffered changes: from Women’s day, to Mothers’ day. He is 
hyperbolic when referring to women’s traits: “experienced”, “successful”, “great, 
“respectful” “life-givers”81. They are also “guardians of the Tajik language” (Thibault, 
2016, 6). Rahmon is at once the Leader and the Father of the Nation, the president 
of a demographically disfigured country, where important segments of the “noble and 
generous” Tajiks must emigrate to seek a better life, resulting in family fractures (La 
Roche, 2016, 218).  
 
Each celebration and what it represents seeks to reinforce Rahmon’s vision and the 
narratives that he has been constructing overtime. Through its recurrence, he makes 
every effort to anchor them in the people’s imaginary. In the process he tries to 
cement further his grip on power. In this regard, and so as to reduce Islam’s 
importance Rahmon underlines Tajikistan’s Persian roots embodied in Navruz 
celebration and in his 2010 speech has gone as far as saying that “the ancient 
holiday of Navruz marks the beginning of our rich history and as valuable heritage is 
closely intertwined with our national culture”82. This year he referred to it as a stability 
and peace instrument83. In his recurrent laudatory language Rahmon places Navruz 
as an indisputable landmark of Tajikistan’s Aryan and Persian roots.  It has even 
been advanced, on Navruz Day in 2016, that “if once again we return to history and 
unite all the Aryan state, then the one who is worthy of Jamshid’s throne is the 
President of Tajikistan” (Khovar.tj, 2016). Each of these events allows Rahmon to 
underline the value of national unity, and as this year marks the 25th anniversary of 																																																								
80 See http://president.tj/en/node/9242 
81 See the speech for the Mother’s day (2016) http://www.president.tj/ru/node/10859 
82 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/2567 
83 See http://www.president.tj/en/node/10965 
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Tajikistan’s independence, mass media, are particularly active in the promotion of 
such a “great and sacred national holiday”. In language much similar to that of the 
president, Khovar.tj writes that: 
 
“the nation forces each of us to work for the sake of prosperity, stability of the 
country, to be always vigilant for the protection of the national and state interests in 
order to adequately fulfil [the] duty before the Motherland and the people of 
Tajikistan” (2016)84.  
 
The focus and the goals remain the same “peace”, “stability” and “the salvation of 
[the] national statehood from disappearance”. In a style much similar to that 
employed by Rahmon, Khovar.tj wrote that Independence celebrations honour the 
“history and creative activities for the sake of the present and future destiny of [the] 
beloved Motherland” (Khovar.tj, 2016). This year several events have been 
organised to highlight its importance and the role played by Rahmon as the peace 
architect. According to Khovar.tj (2016), an encyclopaedia on Tajik culture has been 
just published. It aims to be a “mirror of sacred values of the Tajik nation”, and it 
consists of several volumes: the first one “reveals the ancestral sacred stories and 
the birth of Tajik culture”. The following volumes will depict the immaterial Tajik 
culture such as “Navruz”, “the national clothes”, “the children’s games”, “the National 
Social celebrations”. The encyclopaedia completes Rahmon’s book on Tajikistan’s 
history, “Tajiks in the mirror of History”85.  
 
Larger than life, public works strive to match Rahmon’s megalomaniac propensity. 
Everything seems to be en route to make of him a living narrative: a garden of 160 
hectares, named the Leader of the Nation, preceded the fruit garden marking the 
twenty-five years of sovereign Tajikistan86. Some villages, and neighbourhoods were 
renamed Rahmonobod and his name is anchored throughout Tajikistan’s landscape. 
An ever-loving motherland’s son, he is depicted in a stone mosaic, “sitting beside his 
mother, hands cupped in supplication” (Rickleton, 2016). These monuments are at 
																																																								
84 See http://khovar.tj/eng/2016/04/independence-our-great-and-sacred-national-holiday-2/ 
85 See http://khovar.tj/rus/2016/04/entsiklopediya-kultury-tadzhikskogo-naroda-zerkalo-duhovnyh-
tsennostej-tadzhikskoj-natsii/ 
86 See http://khovar.tj/rus/2016/02/zakladka-sada-25-letie-nezavisimosti-tadzhikistana/ 
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Tajiks’ requests to anchor the figure of the leader in Tajikistan (Fergananews.com, 
2016).  
In that logic of the great distractions, the underlying intention would be to move 
people’s attention away from political reflection, and to anchor them on the Leader’s 
narratives. It is of course a top-down approach in which public institutions, high 
officials, noteworthy personalities participate, interpreting the will and acting as 
spokespersons of the noble and generous Tajik people. The opposition is, for all 
practical purpose irrelevant and almost non-existent, erased from Tajikistan’s recent 
history. The Leader is loved and cherished and as soon as he appears in one his 
many official visits, locals bow down showing respect and love, women queue for 
hours to get a small space on the traditional carpet where Rahmon would walk 
(Fergananews.com, 2016).  
 
In the end, as Matveeva pointedly remarks “all of these examples portend to how 
symbols and discursive narratives are used to aid regime legitimation”87. Put also in a 
different manner, as Isaacs and Polese underline, “without recourse to a genuine 
democratic plebiscite, Central Asian regimes have often resorted to grandiose public 
events, discourses, and symbols to justify their rule and the centrality of their 
leadership to state sovereignty, prosperity, and survival” (2015, 374). 
 
 		
  
																																																								
87 In (Isaacs and Polese, 2015, 374) 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The thesis’ development has permitted to outline the following results related to the 
three premises highlighted in the introduction: 
 
Rahmon has succeeded in consolidating his grip on power and in maintaining the 
country from falling apart. As national identity narratives have been a top-down 
enterprise, in the absence of Tajik non-official primary sources, it cannot be asserted 
that his apparent success results from the efficacy of his nation building efforts. 
 
Viewed from the outside, Rahmon’s narratives anchored on ancient roots, twenty-five 
years after independence, are a still ongoing process. His hammering on the same 
topics would suggest that they have not been quite well engrained. The ancient-
modern narrative, Rogun dam, is visibly still an unaccomplished endeavour. It is not 
possible to clearly determine the degree of identification with those narratives, Rogun 
dam included.  
 
As Rahmon has consolidated his grip on power, recent political developments (the 
constitutional referendum, and the Law on the Leader, and the numerous great 
distractions or performative initiatives) demonstrate that Rahmon has become a 
narrative of his own, and that formally and legally he is the embodiment of national 
identity and values. 
 
Put differently, the thesis has focused on Rahmon’s vision of a nation. In its treatment 
it has sought to answer the research question: How have Tajikistan’s nation building 
narratives and state structures rendered Rahmon the symbol of national unity? The 
research undertaken allows me to maintain that the narratives and, particularly the 
role of pubic structures haven been instrumental in making Rahmon the incarnation 
of Tajikistan’s cohesiveness and values. 
 
It becomes clear that throughout the last twenty-five years Rahmon has striven to 
instil a sense of collective belonging with a rich millenary past. He has unearthed 
Tajikistan Aryan roots, highlighted Tajiks linkages with Zoroastrianism and with the 
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Samanids, and insisted on their linguistic distinctiveness. He has underline how Islam 
itself benefitted from Tajiks’ traits, a resilient yet generous and peace-loving people.  
 
These are in brief, the discursive elements underlining Rahmon’s ongoing identity 
construction efforts. It is that which is also at the base of his most ambitious 
undergoing water project: Roghun, a symbol of national greatness and a most useful 
tool for economic development. Judging from Rahmon’s speeches those themes 
appear like a mantra, as recurrent as the performative initiatives referred above. 
However, as the country is increasingly hermetic, there is no reliable way of finding 
out how those topics connect with Tajiks nor is it possible to know what kinds of 
connections they make between Tajikistan’s presumed past greatness and the 
present. Additionally, given Rahmon’s continuing efforts, nation and national identity 
consolidation appear to be a still unattained goal, a permanent work in progress and, 
clearly, a top-down initiative.  
 
The thesis has sought to underline and expand upon a not much explored angle in 
Tajikistan’s nation building narratives: the gradual and effective making of Rahmon 
as a national unity symbol.  I believe it is worthwhile to broaden on this particular 
subject and, of special importance, on Rahmon and Rahmon’s extended family, as 
there are clear signs that a sort of Rahmonian dynasty is the making. It would be 
equally interesting to undertake further research on existing internal political and 
economic power holders and the likelihood they may represent a real challenge to 
Rahmon’s authority. 
 
A highly promising research field concerns the extreme dependency on Russia as 
Tajik labour absorber, a harsh reality that contradicts Rahmon’s efforts to distance 
Tajikistan from its Soviet linkages, never alluded to in the one-sided narratives on 
nation building.  
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